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Recent studies on asset prices and monetary policy consider the beneﬁts
of allowing the monetary authority to respond to asset prices in a mone-
tary policy rule.1 These studies frequently rely on two key assumptions: (1)
asset price movements create distortions in economic activity through
their eﬀect on the ability of managers to ﬁnance investment; and (2) there
exist exogenous “bubbles” or nonfundamental asset price movements.2 In
such environments, nonfundamental increases in asset prices cause invest-
ment booms, an increase in output above potential, and rising rates of in-
ﬂation. In this framework, a monetary policy that responds strongly to in-
ﬂation is frequently found to be suﬃcient in suppressing the undesirable
consequences of these asset price ﬂuctuations. In other words, there is no
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1. Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), Cecchetti et al. (2000), Gilchrist and Leahy (2002),
and Tetlow (2005) provide recent examples.
2. Mishkin and White (2003) provide recent discussions of the evidence on stock market
bubbles and their role in monetary policy for the U.S. economy, while Okina, Shirakawa, and
Shiratsuka (2001) describe the Japanese stock market boom of the late 1980s and assess the
conduct of monetary policy during this episode. Borio and Lowe (2002) discuss the relation-
ship between ﬁnancial imbalances and monetary policy.need to respond to asset prices above and beyond what is implied by their
ability to forecast inﬂation.
The notion that adopting a policy of responding strongly to inﬂation is
a suﬃcient response to bubbles rests in part on the assumption that bubbles
distort the economy by increasing managers’ ability to invest without dis-
torting their perceptions of the value of new investment. As Dupor (2005)
emphasizes, these conclusions are tempered to the extent that bubbles di-
rectly inﬂuence managerial valuations of capital. More generally, nonfun-
damental movements in asset prices cause distortions in aggregate demand
through their inﬂuence on markups and, hence, inﬂation and distort the
consumption/investment decision by inﬂuencing the cost of capital. A
monetary policymaker with one instrument—the nominal interest rate—
faces a trade-oﬀ between reducing distortions owing to variation in the
markup and distortions owing to variations in the return on capital. In
such an environment, the policymaker may ﬁnd monetary policy rules that
respond to asset prices to be beneﬁcial.
While much of the literature has focused on nonfundamental move-
ments in asset prices, it is often recognized that asset price booms occur in
conjunction with changes in the underlying economic fundamentals
(Beaudry and Portier 2004). A case in point is the late 1990s run-up in U.S.
stock prices that was closely tied to perceived changes in trend productiv-
ity growth. Thus, a key question in the literature is whether the monetary
authority can identify the source of movements in asset prices in an envi-
ronment of technological change. As emphasized by Edge, Laubach, and
Williams (2004), it is plausible to believe that the underlying trend growth
in productivity is unknown and that both the private sector and the poli-
cymaker learn over time about the true state of the economy. In this case,
the beneﬁts of allowing the monetary authority to respond to asset prices
may depend on both the information structure of the economy and the ex-
tent to which asset price movements distort economic activity through the
ﬁnancing mechanism described in the preceding.
To address these issues, we reconsider the design of monetary policy
rules in an environment where asset prices reﬂect expectations about
underlying changes in the trend growth rate of technology. Our economy is
a standard New Keynesian framework augmented to include ﬁnancial
market imperfections through the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism de-
scribed in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). In our framework, the
private sector and the policymaker are uncertain about the trend growth
rate of technology but gradually learn over time. This learning process is
reﬂected in asset price movements. Revisions to expectations owing to
learning inﬂuence asset prices and entrepreneurial net worth. Such revi-
sions feed back into investment demand and are magniﬁed through the ﬁ-
nancial accelerator mechanism.
Our ﬁndings reinforce previous results in the literature. In the absence of
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even in situations where the private sector is uncertain about the true state
of technology growth. In the absence of ﬁnancial frictions, our economy
shows essentially one distortion, owing to variations in the markup, which
inﬂuences input choices. Suppressing inﬂation stabilizes the markup.
Adding asset prices to the monetary policy rule is unlikely to provide fur-
ther beneﬁts, even in situations where the private sector is uninformed
about the economy’s true state of growth.
In the presence of ﬁnancial market imperfections, a policy that responds
strongly to inﬂation eliminates much of the distortionary eﬀect of asset
price movements on economic activity. Nonetheless, with inﬂation stabi-
lized, the economy still exhibits signiﬁcant deviations of output from po-
tential. By giving weight to asset prices in the monetary policy rule, the
monetary authority can improve upon these outcomes. Stabilizing output
relative to potential comes at the cost of increased volatility of inﬂation,
however. Thus, as in Dupor (2005), the monetary authority faces a trade-
oﬀ owing to its desire to eliminate two distortions with one instrument.
Our policy analysis emphasizes the beneﬁts to responding to an asset
price gap—the gap between the observed asset prices and the potential
level of asset prices that arises in a ﬂexible-price economy without ﬁnancial
market imperfections. Computing such a gap requires the policymaker to
make inferences regarding the true state of technology growth. We can
thus distinguish between situations where the monetary authority has full
information regarding the underlying state of technology growth and situ-
ations where the policymaker is learning about it over time. We can simi-
larly distinguish between environments where the private sector is fully in-
formed or is learning over time.
Our results imply that the beneﬁts to responding to the asset price gap
depend on the information structure of the economy. The beneﬁts of re-
sponding to the asset price gap are greatest when the private sector is un-
informed about the economy’s true state of growth, but the policymaker is
informed. At the other extreme, responding to the asset price gap may be
detrimental when the private sector is informed and the policymaker is un-
informed. In this case, the policymaker is responding to the “wrong” asset
price gap.
We also consider alternative monetary policy rules that do not require
the policymaker to infer the state of growth of the economy. These include
responding to either asset price growth or output growth. Our ﬁndings sug-
gest that both of these policies are likely to do well in our environment. On
the other hand, we ﬁnd that responding to the level of asset prices, as con-
sidered in much of the previous literature, is a particularly bad policy.
Thus, the destabilizing eﬀects of responding to asset price movements em-
phasized in previous studies may in part reﬂect the assumption that the
monetary authority responds to the level of asset prices rather than their
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to changes in asset prices is better than responding to the level itself.
2.1.1 Related Literature
Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), Cecchetti et al. (2000), Gilchrist and
Leahy (2002), and Tetlow (2005) introduce nonfundamental bubbles into
an economy and study the beneﬁts of allowing the monetary authority to
respond to asset prices. According to Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001),
a policy that implies a strong response to inﬂation stabilizes the economy,
and asset prices are only useful to the extent that they provide information
about inﬂation and the output gap. In this environment, bubbles are ex-
ogenous and aﬀect the economy by increasing aggregate demand through
a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism. A policy that responds strongly to in-
ﬂation is suﬃcient to suppress this aggregate demand channel. Cecchetti 
et al. (2000) argue that there may be some beneﬁt to responding to asset
prices in such environments although it is likely to be small. This literature
suggests that adopting a monetary policy rule that implies a strong policy
response to inﬂation is suﬃcient even under two situations in which asset
prices may contain a relatively large amount of information about the state
of the economy: an economy with ﬁnancial frictions and an economy with
shocks that have a persistent impact on technology growth (Gilchrist and
Leahy 2002).
Our framework diﬀers from this analysis in two fundamental ways.
First, in our economy, deviations between asset prices and underlying cash
ﬂows occur because agents do not know the true state of technology
growth but instead are learning about it over time. Recent studies by
French (2001), Roberts (2001), and Kahn and Rich (2003) emphasize the
distinction between transitory and persistent movements in the growth
rate of technology. Edge, Laubach, and Williams (2004) study the eﬀect of
learning about transitory and persistent movements in technology growth
in a model-based environment. As an example of such learning, they doc-
ument that the productivity growth forecasts of professional forecasters
and policymakers did not change until 1999 although the trend had shifted
in the mid-1990s. They also demonstrate that a constant-gain Kalman ﬁl-
ter tracks well the actual forecasts of trend productivity in the 1970s and in
the 1990s made by forecasters and policymakers. Pakko (2002) and Edge,
Laubach, and Williams (2004) introduce learning with a Kalman ﬁlter to a
real business cycle (RBC) model to understand the eﬀect of changes in the
trend growth rate of technology on economic activity. Our chapter is also
related to Tambalotti (2003), who considers the role of learning in a dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium model with price rigidities but no
capital accumulation, and Dupor (2005), who considers an environment
where agents learn about fundamental and nonfundamental shocks to the
return on capital.
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(2005), who allow for learning about the trend growth rate of technology
in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with price rigidities and
capital accumulation. We extend their framework by allowing both the
private sector and the policymaker to learn about the true state of technol-
ogy growth. We do so in an environment where learning inﬂuences asset
values, which feed back into real economic activity through the net worth
channel emphasized by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). We show
that this ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism may be enhanced in the presence
of learning. This stronger feedback mechanism raises the beneﬁt to re-
sponding to asset prices, even in an environment where the policymaker is
itself uninformed about the true state of technology growth.
Second, much of the previous literature focuses on the beneﬁts of re-
sponding to the level of asset prices. In our framework, asset price move-
ments would occur in the absence of frictions in either price-setting or ﬁ-
nancial markets. Thus, we emphasize the importance of the monetary
authority’s response to the asset price gap—the gap between the observed
asset prices and the underlying potential level of asset prices. Our ﬁnding
that responding to the growth rate of asset prices is also beneﬁcial is related
to Tetlow (2005), who compares the beneﬁt of responding to the growth
rate of asset prices relative to the level of asset prices in a robust control
framework.
Our emphasis on asset price movements that are tied to fundamental
changes in the underlying trend growth rate of the economy is related to the
recent literature on the response of asset prices to news about future eco-
nomic fundamentals. Barsky and DeLong (1993) and Kiyotaki (1990)
study the eﬀects of learning about the transitory and persistent compo-
nents of dividend growth on asset prices in a partial equilibrium model.
When the transitory and persistent shocks to dividend growth are not ob-
served separately, investors extrapolate a transitory movement in dividend
growth into the future, generating a large response in asset prices. The in-
terest rate is ﬁxed in these partial equilibrium models, which helps to gen-
erate large movements in asset prices. Kiley (2000) provides a comparison
of the asset pricing implications of partial and general equilibrium models.
Asset prices may fall in response to increases in the growth rate of tech-
nology, as real interest rates rise in general equilibrium.
In an RBC framework that allows for capital accumulation, a persistent
increase in the growth rate of technology leads to a rise in the real interest
rate and decreases in investment and asset prices. Consumption rises by a
large amount due to a large wealth eﬀect of expectations of future tech-
nology improvements (Barro and King 1984; Campbell 1994; Cochrane
1994). Using a New Keynesian model, Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) show
that asset prices may rise rather than fall in response to a persistent in-
crease in the growth rate of technology. This positive response in asset
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to inﬂation. More recently, Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2005) em-
phasize the role of monetary policy in generating an asset price boom in a
model with habit formation and adjustment costs to investment growth. In
their model, favorable news about future technology tends to lower current
inﬂation. As the monetary authority responds by lowering interest rates,
asset prices rise. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006) consider RBC environments
that may produce asset price booms following favorable news about future
technology. In our framework, as in Gilchrist and Leahy (2002), asset
prices are more likely to rise in response to favorable news about future
technology in the presence of accommodative monetary policy, and move-
ments in asset prices are ampliﬁed in the presence of the ﬁnancial acceler-
ator mechanism.
Finally, there is a rich literature emphasizing the welfare beneﬁts of
monetary policy rules in environments with imperfect information and
environments that allow for ﬁnancial frictions. Dupor (2005) and Edge,
Laubach, and Williams (2005) solve a Ramsey problem to study the char-
acteristics of the optimal monetary policy, while Tambalotti (2003) uses a
second-order approximation to the utility function in a model without
capital. More closely related to our work, Faia and Monacelli (2006) use
a second-order approximation to the policy function in the Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) framework and ﬁnd that including the level
of asset prices in the interest rate rule with a modest coeﬃcient is beneﬁ-
cial to welfare when the coeﬃcient on inﬂation is relatively small. When
the coeﬃcient on inﬂation is suﬃciently large, including asset prices in the
policy rule does not improve welfare. Although we focus on a quadratic
loss function rather than formal welfare analysis, our results imply mod-
est beneﬁts of allowing the monetary authority to respond to the asset
price gap, even when the monetary authority is responding strongly to in-
ﬂation. This diﬀerence in results may be partially attributable to our em-
phasis on asset price gaps rather than asset price levels as the variable in
the policy rule.3
2.2 Model
The model is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a ﬁ-
nancial accelerator mechanism (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999).4
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3. Our ﬁnding that a policy that responds to the growth rate of asset prices or the growth
rate of output performs well when the policymaker has imperfect information about the state
of technology growth is related to Orphanides and Williams (2002), who ﬁnd that in environ-
ments where the natural rates are unobservable, an interest rate rule that includes changes in
economic activity (which does not require information on the natural rates) performs well.
4. The description of the model closely follows Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and
Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2006).The ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism links the relative price of capital (in-
terpretable as asset prices), balance-sheet conditions of borrowers, the ex-
ternal ﬁnance premium deﬁned as the cost of external funds relative to the
cost of internal funds, and investment spending. Speciﬁcally, an unex-
pected increase in asset prices—as a result of a favorable shock to produc-
tivity of the economy, for example—increases the net worth of borrowers,
decreases the external ﬁnance premium, and increases the capital expendi-
tures of these borrowers. In general equilibrium, the increase in capital ex-
penditures leads to a further increase in asset prices and magniﬁes the
mechanism just described. To clarify the role of the ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism in the relationship between asset prices and monetary policy,
the following sections also consider a model in which the ﬁnancial acceler-
ator mechanism is absent.
2.2.1 Structure of the Economy
We ﬁrst describe the structure of the economy, including the speciﬁca-
tion of monetary policy rules and the information structure. We consider
the problems of households, entrepreneurs, capital producers, and retail-
ers in turn.
Households
Households consume, hold money, save in the form of a one-period risk-
less bond whose nominal rate of return is known at the time of the pur-
chase, and supply labor to the entrepreneurs who manage the production
of wholesale goods.




 tu  Ct, Ht,   ,
with
u Ct, Ht,      ln Ct     ξ ln ,
where Ct is consumption, Ht is hours worked, Mt/P t is real balances ac-
quired in period t and carried into period t   1, and  ,  , and ξ are positive
parameters.
The budget constraint is given by
Ct   Ht   Πt   Tt   ,
where Wt is the nominal wage for the household labor, Πt is the real divi-
dends from ownership of retail ﬁrms, Tt is lump-sum taxes, Bt 1 is a risk-
less bond held between period tand period t 1, and Rt
nis the nominal rate
of return on the riskless bond held between period t – 1 and period t.
Bt 1   Rt
nBt   
P t
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clude
(1)    Et  Rn
t 1  ,
and
(2)    Ht
 .
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs manage the production of wholesale goods. The produc-
tion of wholesale goods uses capital constructed by capital producers and
labor supplied by both households and entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs pur-
chase capital from capital goods producers and ﬁnance the expenditures
on capital with both entrepreneurial net worth (internal ﬁnance) and debt
(external ﬁnance). We introduce ﬁnancial market imperfections that make
the cost of external funds depend on the entrepreneur’s balance-sheet con-
dition.
Entrepreneurs are risk neutral. To ensure that entrepreneurs do not ac-
cumulate enough funds to ﬁnance their expenditures on capital entirely
with net worth, we assume that they have a ﬁnite lifetime. In particular, we
assume that each entrepreneur survives until the next period with proba-
bility  . New entrepreneurs enter to replace those who exit. To ensure that
new entrepreneurs have some funds available when starting out, each en-
trepreneur is endowed with Ht
e units of labor that are supplied inelastically
as a managerial input to the wholesale-good production at nominal entre-
preneurial wage Wt
e.
The entrepreneur starts any period twith capital Ktpurchased from cap-
ital producers at the end of period t – 1 and produces wholesale goods Yt
with labor and capital. Labor Lt is a composite of household labor Ht and
entrepreneurial labor Ht
e:
Lt   Ht
1  (Ht
e) .
The entrepreneur’s project is subject to an idiosyncratic shock  t, which
aﬀects both the production of wholesale goods and the eﬀective quantity
of capital held by the entrepreneur. We assume that  tis independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) across entrepreneurs and time, satisfying
E( t)   1. The production function for the wholesale goods is given by
(3) Yt    t(AtLt) Kt
1  ,
where At is exogenous technology common to all the entrepreneurs. Let
PW,t denote the nominal price of wholesale goods, Qt the price of capital
relative to the aggregate price Pt to be deﬁned later, and   the depreciation
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tion revenues and the real value of the undepreciated capital:
 t  (AtL) Kt
1     Qt(1    )Kt .
In any period t, the entrepreneur chooses the demand for both house-
hold labor and entrepreneurial labor to maximize proﬁts given capital Kt
acquired in the previous period. The ﬁrst-order conditions are
(4)  (1    )   ,
and
(5)      .
At the end of period t, after the production of wholesale goods, the en-
trepreneur purchases capital Kt 1 from capital producers at price Qt. The
capital is used as an input to the production of wholesale goods in period 
t   1. The entrepreneur ﬁnances the purchase of capital QtKt 1 partly with
net worth Nt 1 and partly by issuing nominal debt Bt 1:
QtKt 1   Nt 1   .
The entrepreneur’s capital purchase decision depends on the expected
rate of return on capital and the expected marginal cost of ﬁnance. The real
rate of return on capital between period t and period t   1, Rk
t 1, depends
on the marginal proﬁt from the production of wholesale goods and the cap-
ital gain:
(6) Rk
t 1   ,
where Y  t 1 is the average wholesale good production per entrepreneur
(Yt 1    t 1Y  t 1). Under our assumption of Et t 1   1, the expected real
rate of return on capital, EtRk
t 1, is given by
(7) EtRk
t 1   Et   .
In the presence of ﬁnancial market imperfections, the marginal cost of
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mation between borrowers (entrepreneurs) and lenders and a costly state
veriﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, the idiosyncratic shock to entrepreneurs,  t, is
private information for the entrepreneur. To observe this, the lender must
pay an auditing cost that is a ﬁxed proportion  b of the realized gross re-
turn to capital held by the entrepreneur:  bRk
t 1QtKt 1. The entrepreneur
and the lender negotiate a ﬁnancial contract that induces the entrepreneur
to not misrepresent her earnings and minimizes the expected auditing costs
incurred by the lender. We restrict attention to ﬁnancial contracts that are
negotiated one period at a time and oﬀer lenders a payoﬀ that is indepen-
dent of aggregate risk. Under these assumptions, the optimal contract is a
standard debt with costly bankruptcy: if the entrepreneur does not default,
the lender receives a ﬁxed payment independent of the realization of the
idiosyncratic shock  t; and if the entrepreneur defaults, the lender audits
and seizes whatever it ﬁnds.
In equilibrium, the cost of external funds between period t and period 
t   1 is equated to the expected real rate of return on capital (7). We de-
ﬁne the external ﬁnance premium st as the ratio of the entrepreneur’s cost
of external funds to the cost of internal funds, where the latter is equated 
to the cost of funds in the absence of ﬁnancial market imperfections 
Et[Rn
t 1(P t/P t 1)]:
(8) st   .
In the absence of ﬁnancial market imperfections, there is no external ﬁ-
nance premium (st   1).
The agency problem implies that the cost of external funds depends on
the ﬁnancial position of the borrowers. In particular, the external ﬁnance
premium increases when a smaller fraction of capital expenditures is ﬁ-
nanced by the entrepreneur’s net worth:
(9) st   s   ,
where s( ) is an increasing function for Nt 1   QtKt 1. The speciﬁc form of
the function s( ) depends on the primitive parameters of the costly state
veriﬁcation problem, including the bankruptcy cost parameter  b and the
distribution of the idiosyncratic shock  t. We specify a parametric form for
the function s( ) in the next section.
The aggregate net worth of entrepreneurs at the end of period t is the
sum of the equity held by entrepreneurs who survive from period t – 1 and
the aggregate entrepreneurial wage, which consists of the wage earned by
the entrepreneurs surviving from period t– 1 and the wage earned by newly
emerged entrepreneurs in period t:
QtKt 1  
Nt 1
EtRk
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kQt 1 Kt   Et 1Rt
k ·     
   [Rt
kQt 1Kt   Et 1Rt
k(Qt 1Kt   Nt)]   ,
where the second line used the relation Qt–1Kt   Nt   Bt/Pt–1.
Unexpected changes in asset prices are the main source of changes in the
entrepreneurial net worth and, hence, the external ﬁnance premium. Equa-
tions (6) and (7) suggest that unexpected changes in asset prices are the
main source of unexpected changes in the real rate of return on capital—
the diﬀerence between the realized rate of return on capital in period t, Rt
k,
and the rate of return on capital anticipated in the previous period, Et–1Rt
k,
where the latter is the marginal cost of external funds between period t – 1
and t. Equation (10), in turn, suggests that the main source of changes in
the entrepreneurial net worth is unexpected movements in the real rate of
return on capital, under the calibration that the entrepreneurial wage is
small.5 Finally, equation (9) implies that changes in the entrepreneurial net
worth are the main source of changes in the external ﬁnance premium.
Thus, movements in asset prices play a key role in the ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism.
Entrepreneurs going out of business in period tconsume the residual eq-
uity:
(11) Ct
e   (1    )   Rt
kQt 1Kt   Et 1Rt
k ·   ,
where Ct
eis the aggregate consumption of the entrepreneurs who exit in pe-
riod t.
Overall, the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism implies that an unexpected
increase in asset prices increases the net worth of entrepreneurs and im-
proves their balance-sheet conditions. This, in turn, reduces the external ﬁ-
nance premium and increases the demand for capital by these entrepre-
neurs. In equilibrium, the price of capital increases further, and capital
producers increase the production of new capital. This additional increase
in asset prices strengthens the mechanism just described. Thus, the coun-
tercyclical movement in the external ﬁnance premium implied by the ﬁnan-
cial market imperfections magniﬁes the eﬀects of shocks to the economy.
Capital Producers
Capital producers use both ﬁnal goods It and existing capital Kt to con-
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5. In the calibration below, we set   0, which makes the eﬀects of changes in the entre-
preneurial wage on net worth negligible.Each capital producer operates a constant returns-to-scale technology for
capital production  (It/Kt)Kt, where the function  ( ) is increasing and
concave, capturing the increasing marginal costs of capital production.
The aggregate capital accumulation equation is given by
(12) Kt 1   (1    )Kt      Kt.
Taking the relative price of capital Qt as given, capital producers choose
inputs Itand Ktto maximize proﬁts from the formation of new capital. The
following ﬁrst-order condition for the capital producer’s problem implies
that investment (the demand for ﬁnal goods by capital producers) and the
quantity of new capital increase as the relative price of capital—inter-
pretable as asset prices—increases:
(13) Qt   .
Retailers
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers of mea-
sure unity. Retailers buy wholesale goods from entrepreneurs in a compet-
itive manner and then diﬀerentiate the product slightly at zero resource
cost.
Let Yt(z) be the retail goods sold by retailer z, and let Pt(z) be its nomi-
nal price. Final goods, Yt, are the composite of individual retail goods
Yt    
1
0
Yt(z)(ε 1)/ε dz 
ε/(ε 1)
,
and the corresponding price index, Pt, is given by
Pt    
1
0
Pt(z)1 ε dz 
1/(1 ε)
.
Households, capital producers, and the government demand the ﬁnal
goods.
Each retailer faces an isoelastic demand curve given by
(14) Yt(z)    
 ε
Yt.
As in Calvo (1983), each retailer resets price with probability (1 – υ), inde-
pendently of the time elapsed since the last price adjustment. Thus, in each
period, a fraction (1 – υ) of retailers reset their prices, while the remaining
fraction υ keeps their prices unchanged. The real marginal cost to the re-













56 Simon Gilchrist and Masashi Saitorelative to the price of ﬁnal goods (PW,t/P t). Each retailer takes the demand
curve in equation (14) and the price of wholesale goods as given and sets
the retail price Pt(z). All retailers given a chance to reset their prices in pe-
riod t choose the same price Pt
∗ given by
(15) Pt
∗   ,
where Λt,i  iCt/Ct iis the stochastic discount factor that the retailers take
as given.
The aggregate price evolves according to
(16) Pt   [υPt 1
1 ε   (1   υ) (Pt
∗)1 ε]1/(1 ε).
Combining equations (15) and (16) yields an expression that relates the
current inﬂation to the current real marginal cost and the expected inﬂa-
tion, as described in the appendix.
Aggregate Resource Constraint
The aggregate resource constraint for ﬁnal goods is
(17) Yt   Ct   Ct
e   It   Gt,
where Gt is the government expenditures that we assume to be exogenous.6
Government
Exogenous government expenditures Gtare ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes
Tt and money creation:
(18) Gt    Tt.
The money stock is adjusted to support the interest rate rule speciﬁed in
the following. Lump-sum taxes adjust to satisfy the government budget
constraint.
Technology Shock Process
The growth rate of technology has both transitory and persistent com-
ponents:
(19) ln At   ln At 1    t   εt.
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6. In the following calibration, we assume that actual resource costs to bankruptcy are neg-
ligible.The persistent component of technology growth in deviation from the
mean growth rate of technology, ( t –  ), follows an AR(1) process:
(20) ( t    )    d( t   1    )   υt.
Shocks to the transitory and persistent components of technology growth are
(21) εt ~ i.i.d.N(0,  ε
2),
and
(22) υt ~ i.i.d.N(0,  2
υ).
Information Structure
Our technology process allows for two sources of variation: shocks to
the transitory and persistent components of technology growth. We con-
sider both the case of full information where agents observe both shocks
separately and the case of imperfect information where agents observe the
technology series, At, but cannot decompose movements in technology
growth into their respective sources.
Monetary Policy Rules
The monetary authority conducts monetary policy using interest rate
rules. We consider the following types of interest rate rules.
Policy Rule with Inﬂation Only. The ﬁrst rule we consider is the one with
current inﬂation only:
(23) Rn
t 1   Rn  t
  ,
where  t   P t/P t–1 is inﬂation, and Rn is the steady-state nominal interest
rate on the one-period bond. We assume that the policymaker targets 0
percent inﬂation. Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) show that this rule
with a large coeﬃcient    performs well in the economy with shocks to the
bubble component of asset prices as well as shocks to technology.
Policy Rule with the Asset Price Gap. In the second rule that we consider,
the monetary authority adjusts interest rates based on current inﬂation
and the gap between the observed asset prices Qtand the inferred potential
level of asset prices Qt
*:
(24) Rn
t 1   Rn t




* is the equilibrium level of asset prices in the economy without
pricing and ﬁnancial frictions.
The potential level of asset prices is computed under the information
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full,t, which is obtained by solving a ﬂexible-price model without ﬁ-
nancial frictions under full information. When the policymaker has im-
perfect information, we use Q*
imp,t, which is obtained by solving a ﬂexible-
price model without ﬁnancial frictions under imperfect information.
There are two ways to construct Qt
* from the model. In the ﬁrst, one
could use the hypothetical levels of the state variables in the frictionless
economy to compute Qt
*. In the second, one may use the levels of the state
variables in the model with both pricing and ﬁnancial market frictions
combined with the decision rule for the frictionless economy to compute
Qt
*. Neiss and Nelson (2003) follow the ﬁrst approach, and Woodford
(2003) argues that the second approach is more realistic. We adopt the ﬁrst
procedure because it is somewhat easier to work with.
Policy Rule with the Natural Rate and the Asset Price Gap.We also consider
a policy rule that allows the policymaker to respond to movements in the
natural rate of interest:
(25) Rn
t 1   R*
t 1  t




t 1 is the natural rate of interest that prevails between period t and
period t   1. We deﬁne the natural rate of interest as the real interest rate
that supports the eﬃcient allocation in the economy without pricing and
ﬁnancial frictions. It is computed based on the information available to the
policymaker.
Policy Rule with Asset Price Growth or Output Growth.The policy rule with
the asset price gap requires the policymaker to compute Qt
*—the level of as-
set prices in the ﬂexible-price economy without ﬁnancial frictions. An al-
ternative would be to allow the policymaker to respond to the growth rate
of observed asset prices:
(26) Rn
t 1   Rn t
    
 Q
.
This rule is considered in Tetlow (2005).
For comparison purposes, we also consider a monetary policy rule that
includes a policy response to the growth rate of output:
(27) Rn
t 1   Rn t
    
 Y
,
where   is the mean growth rate of technology.
Policy Rule with the Level of Asset Prices. As another rule that does not re-
quire the policymaker to infer the unobserved shocks and thus the poten-
tial level of asset prices, we consider a policy rule that includes a response
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level:
(28) Rn
t 1   Rn  t
    
 Q
,
where Q is the nonstochastic steady-state level of asset prices. This rule is
considered in Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) and in Faia and Mona-
celli (2006). This rule does not take into account variation in the potential
level of asset prices.
2.2.2 Filtering under Imperfect Information
Let Zt   At/At–1 denote technology growth, z ˜
t   (ln Zt –  ) the percent-
age deviation of technology growth from the mean, and d ˜
t   ( t –  ) the
percentage deviation of the persistent component of technology growth
from the mean. Then we can write the technology process in equations (19)
and (20) as
(29) z ˜   d ˜
t   εt,
and
(30) d ˜
t    dd ˜
t 1    t.
Under full information, agents observe both the shock to the transitory
component of technology growth, εt, and the shock to the persistent com-
ponent of technology growth, υt. Under imperfect information, agents ob-
serve z ˜t, or the sum of two components, (d ˜
t εt) but do not observe the two
shocks separately.
Let E[d ˜
t|z ˜t, z ˜t–1, ...]   d ˜
t|t denote the inference of agents about the current
state of the persistent component of technology growth based on the ob-
servations of current and past technology growth. We assume that agents
update inferences based on the steady-state Kalman ﬁlter:
(31) d ˜
t|t    z ˜t   (1    )  dd ˜
t 1|t 1,
where the gain,  , is given by
(32)     ,
and   measures the signal-to-noise ratio:
(33)     .
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60 Simon Gilchrist and Masashi SaitoIt is straightforward to show that the gain,  , is monotonically increas-
ing in both the signal-to-noise ratio,  , and the AR(1) coeﬃcient on the
persistent component of technology growth,  d.
Given d ˜
t|t, the inference about the shock to the transitory component of
technology growth, εt|t   E[εt|z ˜t, z ˜t–1, ...], is given by
(34) εt|t   z ˜t   d ˜
t|t,
and the inference about the shock to the persistent component of technol-
ogy growth, υt|t   E[υt|z ˜t, z ˜t–1, ...], is given by
(35) υt|t   d ˜
t|t    dd ˜
t 1|t 1.
Properties of the Inference under Imperfect Information
We now illustrate the properties of the inference of agents about the state
of technology growth. We consider how each of the shocks to the transi-
tory and persistent components of technology growth aﬀects the inference
of agents.7
Figure 2.1 presents the response to a 1 percent increase in the transitory
component of technology growth. The dashed line is the actual persistent
component of technology growth in deviation from the mean technology
growth rate, d ˜
t   ( t –  ). The solid line is the inferred persistent compo-
nent of technology growth in deviation from the mean growth rate, d ˜
t|t. Al-
though the shock considered here has no impact on the persistent compo-
nent of technology growth, agents initially interpret part of the observed
changes in technology growth to be persistent. Over time, they gradually
learn that the shock was to the transitory component of technology
growth.
Figure 2.2 presents the eﬀect of a 1 percent increase in the persistent
component of technology growth on both the actual and the inferred per-
sistent component of technology growth, d ˜
t and d ˜
t|t. Although the shock
considered here changes the persistent component of technology growth,
agents initially interpret most of the observed increase in technology
growth to be transitory. Over time, as agents accumulate more observa-
tions of technology growth, they gradually revise their inferences.
Diﬀerence in Information between the Private Sector and the Policymaker
Our framework allows us to consider the case where the policymaker has
diﬀerent information from the private sector. The case where the policy-
maker and the private sector have the same information about the aggre-
gate shocks to the economy is arguably more realistic than the case where
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7. The parameter values related to the shock process used in these experiments are de-
scribed in the following section.they have diﬀerent information. Considering the cases where they have
diﬀerent information is useful for our analysis because in these cases the
beneﬁts or the losses from allowing a policy response to the asset price gap
or the natural rate of interest are the greatest. Speciﬁcally, as we see in later
sections, the gains from allowing the policymaker to respond to move-
ments in the natural rate of interest or the asset price gap are greatest when
the policymaker has full information and the private sector has imperfect
information.8 Allowing the policymaker to respond to the natural rate of
interest or the asset price gap is most harmful when the policymaker has
imperfect information and the private sector has full information.
In the case where the policymaker has full information and the private
sector has imperfect information, we preclude the possibility that the lat-
ter learns more about the realizations of the shocks to the transitory and
persistent components of technology growth by observing the former’s be-
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8. As described in the following, we assess the beneﬁts of adopting various interest rate
rules based on the variance of inﬂation and the output gap.
Figure 2.1 Belief response to a transitory shock to technology growth
Note: The dashed line is the realization of the persistent component of technology growth in
percentage deviation from the mean technology growth rate: d ˜
t   ( t –  ). The straight line 
is the inference about the persistent component of technology growth in percentage deviation
from the mean technology growth rate: E[d ˜
t|z ˜t, z ˜t – 1, ...]   d ˜
t|t.havior.9 Because the policymaker’s setting of the interest rate is aﬀected by
the information it possesses, the policymaker’s information indirectly
aﬀects the behavior of the private sector through movements in the inter-
est rate that is set, however. Thus, the policymaker’s information aﬀects the
private sector’s incentives but not the inferences regarding the state of tech-
nology growth. Likewise, in the case where the policymaker has imperfect
information and the private sector has full information, we preclude the
possibility that the former learns about the unobserved shocks to technol-
ogy growth from the latter’s behavior. Thus, when considering the case of
diﬀerent information between the private sector and the policymaker, we
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Figure 2.2 Belief response to a persistent shock to technology growth
Note: The dashed line is the realization of the persistent component of technology growth in
percentage deviation from the mean technology growth rate: d ˜
t   ( t –  ). The straight line 
is the inference about the persistent component of technology growth in percentage deviation
from the mean technology growth rate: E[d ˜
t|z ˜t, z ˜t – 1, ...]   d ˜
t|t.
9. Speciﬁcally, we assume that, when the private sector solves its optimization problem, it
does not internalize the fact that the potential level of asset prices Qt
∗in the policy rule in equa-
tions (24) and (25) and the natural rate of interest R
∗
t 1 in the policy rule in equations (25) are
functions of the realizations of the shocks  t and εt and capital stock, where those functions
are obtained by solving for the eﬃcient allocation in the frictionless economy. Note also that
the variables about which the private sector learns—the realizations of the shocks to the tran-
sitory and persistent components of technology growth—are exogenous and independent of
the policymaker’s behavior.view our results as providing a useful benchmark to assess the best- and
worst-case scenarios relative to the more realistic situation where the
private sector and the policymaker have the same information or may learn
from each other’s actions. Allowing for learning between the private sector
and the policymaker is an interesting avenue for future research.
2.3 Calibration
We adopt a fairly standard calibration of preferences, technology, and
the price-setting structure. The ﬁnancial sector is calibrated to conform to
a simpliﬁed version of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). These sim-
pliﬁcations allow us to focus on the main distortion that is introduced by
ﬁnancial market imperfections—the introduction of a countercyclical
premium on external funds that drives a wedge between the cost of exter-
nal funds and the cost of internal funds.
2.3.1 Preferences, Technology, and Price-Setting
A period in the model is a quarter. The discount factor is   0.984. The
labor share of income is   2/3. Setting   0.8 implies that the labor
supply elasticity is 1/  1.25. The depreciation rate is   0.025. The elas-
ticity of asset prices with respect to the investment-capital ratio is  k  
–[ ″(i/k)Z(i/k)Z]/  [(i/k)Z]  0.25, the same as in Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999) and Bernanke and Gertler (1999).10 For the price setting,
the steady-state markup is ε/(ε – 1)   1.1, while the probability that a pro-
ducer does not adjust prices in a given quarter is υ   0.75.
2.3.2 Financial Market Imperfections
When log-linearizing the model, we adopt a number of simpliﬁcations to
the original ﬁnancial sector speciﬁed in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999). These simpliﬁcations allow us to focus on the primary distortion
associated with ﬁnancial market imperfections—namely, that it introduces
a time-varying countercyclical wedge between the rate of return on capital
and the rate of return on the riskless bond held by households. We assume
that variations in entrepreneurial consumption and the entrepreneurial
wage are negligible and can be ignored. We further assume that actual re-
source costs to bankruptcy are also negligible. Model simulations con-
ducted under the original Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) frame-
work imply that these simpliﬁcations are reasonable.
The log-linearized model then implies that there are two key ﬁnancial pa-
rameters to choose—the steady-state leverage ratio and the elasticity of the
external ﬁnance premium with respect to leverage. The steady-state ratio of
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10. Tetlow (2005) uses a value of 0.5641, and Faia and Monacelli (2005) use a value of 0.5
for the parameter  k.the real value of the capital stock to the entrepreneur’s net worth is chosen
so that the steady-state leverage ratio is 80 percent or (QK – N)/N   0.8,
which implies (QK)/N 1.8. We also adopt a simpliﬁed functional form for
the determination of the external ﬁnance premium in equation (9):
(36) st    
 
.
Financial market imperfections imply that the external ﬁnance premium
increases when the leverage of the borrowers increases (  0). In line with
the calibration adopted by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), the
elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium with respect to leverage is set to
5 percent:   0.05. These parameterizations imply that the nonstochastic
steady-state level of the external ﬁnance premium is s (QK/N)  1.0298.
Increasing the level of the steady-state leverage ratio or the size of the sen-
sitivity parameter   strengthens the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism. In
the case of no ﬁnancial market imperfections,   0. In this case, balance-
sheet conditions of the entrepreneurs are irrelevant for the cost of external
funds and thus for their capital expenditure decisions.
2.3.3 Shock Process and Filtering
We set the mean technology growth rate at the average quarterly growth
rate of total factor productivity in the United States between 1959 and
2002:   0.00427. We set the standard deviation of the shock to the tran-
sitory component of technology growth at  ε   0.01, the standard devia-
tion of the shock to the persistent component of technology growth at 
   0.001, and the AR(1) coeﬃcient on the persistent component of tech-
nology growth at  d   0.95. These parameter choices imply that the signal-
to-noise ratio in equation (33) is
  0.01.




In this section, we report impulse response functions to technology
shocks to explore the roles of imperfect information and ﬁnancial market
imperfections and their eﬀects on output, inﬂation, asset prices, and the ex-
QtKt 1  
Nt 1
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11. This is within the range of values used in the literature. Edge, Laubach, and Williams
(2005) use   0.025 together with  d   0.95. Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2005) use   0.1
together with  d   0.975. Tambalotti (2003) uses  d   0.93 together with  υ/ ε   0.08 or 
     2
υ/ ε
2   0.0064, implying   0.0369.ternal ﬁnance premium. We explore the potential beneﬁts of various mon-
etary policy rules within this framework.
2.4.1 Transitory Shock to Technology Growth
We begin by examining the response of output, inﬂation, asset prices,
and the external ﬁnance premium to a transitory increase in the growth
rate of technology. We consider the model with and without the ﬁnancial
accelerator and also report the response of the ﬂexible-price economy
without the ﬁnancial accelerator. This economy is undistorted and corre-
sponds to our notion of the potential. We ﬁrst consider a situation where
both the private sector and the policymaker are fully informed regarding
the state of technology growth. We then consider a situation where they
both have imperfect information but learn over time according to the
Kalman ﬁlter speciﬁed in the preceding.
For each model, we consider three monetary policy rules: a policy of re-
sponding weakly to inﬂation (lnRn
t 1   lnRn   1.1 ln t), a policy of re-
sponding strongly to inﬂation (lnRn
t 1 lnRn 2.0 ln t), and a policy rule
that allows a policy response to the asset price gap in addition to a strong
response to inﬂation [lnRn
t 1   lnRn   2.0 ln t   1.5(lnQt – lnQt
∗)]. In the
case of imperfect information for the private sector, we assume that the
monetary authority also has imperfect information so that the interest rate
rule with the asset price gap is now lnRn





imp,t is the level of asset prices in the frictionless economy
under imperfect information.
Full Information for Both the Private Sector and the Policymaker
Figure 2.3 plots the response of the economy without the ﬁnancial ac-
celerator to a transitory increase in the growth rate of technology, when
both the private sector and the policymaker have full information. The
transitory shock to technology growth causes immediate increases in out-
put, asset prices, and inﬂation. Along the path, output continues to rise
owing to capital accumulation, while inﬂation and asset prices return to
their initial steady-state levels. With no ﬁnancial frictions, the external ﬁ-
nance premium is constant at zero.
The strength of the response of output, inﬂation, and asset prices de-
pends on the conduct of monetary policy. Under the policy of responding
weakly to inﬂation, expected real interest rates are low relative to those im-
plied by the ﬂexible-price economy. As a result, asset prices are high, and
output is above potential. In addition, inﬂation is above its target level of
zero. The policy of responding strongly to inﬂation provides substantial
improvement. Expected real interest rates rise suﬃciently so that asset
prices and output track their potential levels implied by the frictionless
economy. In addition, the inﬂation response is dampened considerably. Be-
cause the asset price gap is essentially zero under the policy of responding
66 Simon Gilchrist and Masashi Saitostrongly to inﬂation, adding the asset price gap to the monetary policy rule
produces no change in the path of output and has a negligible eﬀect on in-
ﬂation. Thus, with full information and no ﬁnancial accelerator, there is
little, if any, gain to allowing the monetary authority to respond to the as-
set price gap.
Figure 2.4 plots the response of the economy with the ﬁnancial acceler-
ator to the same transitory shock to technology growth. The ﬁnancial ac-
celerator mechanism ampliﬁes the response of output and inﬂation be-
cause a favorable shock to technology raises asset prices and reduces the
external ﬁnance premium. This ampliﬁed response represents distortions
in the resource allocation induced by ﬁnancial market imperfections. As-
set prices and investment—variables that are closely linked to the ﬁnancial
accelerator mechanism—deviate from their eﬃcient levels by a larger
amount in the presence of ﬁnancial market imperfections.
In the economy with the ﬁnancial accelerator, adopting a policy rule that
implies a strong response to inﬂation brings the path of inﬂation close to
the target. It also reduces the response of the external ﬁnance premium and
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Figure 2.3 Response to a transitory shock to technology growth (full information,
no ﬁnancial accelerator
Note: Weak: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   1.1 ln  t, Strong: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   2.0 ln  t, Asset: ln Rn
t 1  
ln Rn   2.0 ln  t   1.5(ln Qt – ln Qt
∗), RBC: Flexible-price model with full information and no
ﬁnancial market imperfections.reduces the amount of overinvestment that occurs. Nonetheless, there are
still large deviations in output, asset prices, and investment from their po-
tential levels. A policy of responding strongly to inﬂation is successful in
decreasing the distortions arising from price rigidities, but is not suﬃcient
to eliminate the distortions arising from ﬁnancial market imperfections.
Allowing the policymaker to respond to the asset price gap further reduces
the investment distortion owing to the ﬁnancial accelerator. As a result,
output tracks potential more closely. This comes at the cost of producing
deﬂation and increasing inﬂation variability, however.
Imperfect Information for Both the Private Sector and the Policymaker
Figure 2.5 plots the response of the economy without the ﬁnancial ac-
celerator to a transitory shock to technology growth, when both the private
sector and the policymaker have imperfect information. For comparison
purposes, the ﬁgure also shows the path of the frictionless economy under
full information (the path labeled “RBC”). With imperfect information,
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Figure 2.4 Response to a transitory shock to technology growth (full information,
ﬁnancial accelerator)
Note: Weak: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   1.1 ln  t, Strong: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   2.0 ln  t, Asset: ln Rn
t 1  
ln Rn   2.0 ln  t 1.5(ln Qt – ln Qt
∗), RBC: Flexible-price model with full information and no ﬁ-
nancial market imperfections.agents initially give some weight to the possibility that the observed in-
crease in technology growth is persistent. An additional wealth eﬀect own-
ing to a perception of future technology improvements raises desired level
of current consumption relative to the case of full information. Also, such
a perception steepens the desired consumption proﬁle. In the frictionless
economy with imperfect information (not shown in the ﬁgure), this change
in the desired consumption proﬁle is supported by a higher expected real
interest rate, and we observe a smaller response of asset prices and invest-
ment relative to the case of full information.
With the policy that implies a weak response to inﬂation, the rise in ex-
pected real interest rates is smaller than that in the frictionless economy,
and consumption rises sharply without inducing an oﬀsetting fall in in-
vestment. These combined eﬀects imply a larger increase in output than
what is observed in the case of full information. The inﬂation response is
also much larger in the case of imperfect information. A policy of re-
sponding strongly to inﬂation implies an output path below the potential
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Figure 2.5 Response to a transitory shock to technology growth (imperfect infor-
mation, no ﬁnancial accelerator)
Note: Weak: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   1.1 ln  t, Strong: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   2.0 ln  t, Asset: ln Rn
t 1  
ln Rn   2.0 ln  t 1.5(ln Qt – ln Qt
∗), RBC: Flexible-price model with full information and no ﬁ-
nancial market imperfections.under full information, but substantially smaller response in inﬂation.12 In
the model with imperfect information but no ﬁnancial accelerator, adding
the asset price gap to the monetary policy rule again has no eﬀect on the
output path and only a negligible eﬀect on inﬂation.
In the economy with the ﬁnancial accelerator (ﬁgure 2.6), the policy of
responding strongly to inﬂation is again beneﬁcial, leading to reductions in
the response of both the markup and the external ﬁnance premium. The
model still implies distortions owing to the ﬁnancial accelerator, however,
and as a result, there are beneﬁts to responding to the asset price gap. Al-
lowing the monetary authority to respond to the asset price gap stabilizes
the external ﬁnance premium and largely eliminates the overinvestment
that occurs due to the ﬁnancial accelerator. Output tracks potential more
closely, but this once again occurs at the cost of increasing inﬂation vari-
ability.
Overall, the ﬁnancial accelerator has eﬀects on the external ﬁnance pre-
mium under imperfect information that are similar to those under full in-
formation. In response to a transitory shock, the primary eﬀect of imper-
fect information is to cause a consumption boom that leads to increases in
output and inﬂation. Although such a consumption boom can also inﬂu-
ence asset prices and investment demand, imperfect information leads to
an oﬀsetting impulse to wait to invest in response to a perceived persistent
increase in the growth rate of technology. As a result, with a policy that re-
sponds weakly to inﬂation, the investment distortions owing to the ﬁnan-
cial accelerator are only slightly larger under imperfect information than
under full information.13 Under both full and imperfect information, we
ﬁnd that there are beneﬁts to adopting a policy rule that implies a strong
response to inﬂation. In both cases, allowing the monetary authority to re-
spond to the asset price gap reduces the overinvestment that occurs be-
cause of the decline in the external ﬁnance premium. Because responding
to the asset price gap also produces deﬂation, the overall beneﬁts will de-
pend on the relative importance of output gap stability and inﬂation sta-
bility.
2.4.2 Persistent Shock to Technology Growth
We now consider the eﬀect of a persistent increase in the growth rate of
technology. We begin with the case in which both the private sector and the
policymaker have full information and then report the results obtained un-
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12. With imperfect information, a policy of responding strongly to inﬂation implies an out-
put path that tracks the “potential output” path consistent with the policymaker’s belief un-
der imperfect information rather than that consistent with the true state of technology
growth. The former (not shown in the ﬁgure) is below the latter (the path labeled “RBC”) in
this case.
13. This can be seen by comparing the movements in asset prices and the external ﬁnance
premium labeled “Weak” in ﬁgure 2.4 and ﬁgure 2.6.der imperfect information. We again consider policy rules that include a
weak response to inﬂation, a strong response to inﬂation, and a rule that
allows the monetary authority to respond to the asset price gap. We also re-
port the response of the frictionless economy under full information,
which corresponds to our notion of potential when we assess economic
outcomes under alternative monetary policy rules.
Full Information for Both the Private Sector and the Policymaker
Figure 2.7 plots the response of the economy without the ﬁnancial ac-
celerator to a persistent increase in technology growth, when both the
private sector and the policymaker have full information. With no distor-
tions (the path labeled “RBC”), a persistent increase in technology growth
implies a boom in consumption, but an initial fall in investment and asset
prices. Over time, investment and asset prices rise as the process of capital
accumulation takes place.
In the sticky-price model, the response of the economy again depends on
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Figure 2.6 Response to a transitory shock to technology growth (imperfect infor-
mation, ﬁnancial accelerator)
Note: Weak: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   1.1 ln  t, Strong: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   2.0 ln  t, Asset: ln Rn
t 1  
ln Rn   2.0 ln  t 1.5(ln Qt – ln Qt
∗), RBC: Flexible-price model with full information and no ﬁ-
nancial market imperfections.the conduct of monetary policy. Under the policy of responding weakly to
inﬂation, the model generates less of an initial reduction in investment and
a stronger output response. Inﬂation rises by 16 percentage points in this
case. The policy of responding strongly to inﬂation succeeds in dampening
inﬂation and brings output in line with potential. Investment and asset
prices now fall upon impact, which eliminates the asset price gap. Without
the ﬁnancial accelerator, there is essentially no diﬀerence between the
economy’s response with and without the asset price gap in the monetary
policy rule.
In the economy with the ﬁnancial accelerator (ﬁgure 2.8), the persistent
increase in technology growth combined with the policy of responding
weakly to inﬂation causes a sharp drop in the external ﬁnance premium, a
positive response of investment, and a substantial increase in asset prices.
Asset prices rise rather than fall at the onset of a persistent increase in
technology growth in the presence of the ﬁnancial accelerator and accom-
modative monetary policy. The initial inﬂation response is also larger
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Figure 2.7 Response to a persistent shock to technology growth (full information,
no ﬁnancial accelerator)
Note: Weak: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   1.1 ln  t, Strong: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   2.0 ln  t, Asset: ln Rn
t 1  
ln Rn   2.0 ln  t 1.5(ln Qt – ln Qt
∗), RBC: Flexible-price model with full information and no ﬁ-
nancial market imperfections.now—on the order of 20 percentage points. The policy of responding
strongly to inﬂation provides substantial beneﬁts in terms of the output
gap and inﬂation stabilization. We still observe movements in the external
ﬁnance premium and, hence, some distortions in asset prices and invest-
ment, however. Allowing the monetary authority to respond to the asset
price gap provides modest beneﬁts in terms of further reducing the distor-
tion in investment spending owing to the ﬁnancial accelerator. This policy
once again produces deﬂation.
Imperfect Information for Both the Private Sector and the Policymaker
Under imperfect information, the private sector initially gives a rela-
tively large weight to the possibility that the observed increase in technol-
ogy growth is transitory. The initial response is thus closer to what we
would observe in the case of a transitory shock to technology growth un-
der full information. Over time, the private sector learns that the increase
in technology growth is persistent, and the economic outcomes become
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Figure 2.8 Response to a persistent shock to technology growth (full information,
ﬁnancial accelerator)
Note: Weak: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   1.1 ln  t, Strong: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   2.0 ln  t, Asset: ln Rn
t 1  
ln Rn   2.0 ln  t 1.5(ln Qt – ln Qt
∗), RBC: Flexible-price model with full information and no ﬁ-
nancial market imperfections.more similar to those obtained in the case of a persistent shock to technol-
ogy growth under full information.
In the economy without the ﬁnancial accelerator (ﬁgure 2.9), the persis-
tent increase in technology growth combined with the policy of respond-
ing weakly to inﬂation again implies a large, albeit delayed, increase in in-
ﬂation. In addition, output is more procyclical with sticky prices than
would be the case under ﬂexible prices. A policy of responding strongly to
inﬂation dampens movements in the markup and eliminates most of the
movements in inﬂation. In this case, output is above true potential but
tracks the output level that would occur in the frictionless economy with
imperfect information.14
With the ﬁnancial accelerator (ﬁgure 2.10), the persistent increase in
technology growth again produces a countercyclical movement in the ex-
ternal ﬁnance premium that implies a large distortion in investment spend-
ing relative to the frictionless RBC outcome. A policy of responding
strongly to inﬂation reduces the size of asset price movements and reduces
but does not eliminate movements in the external ﬁnance premium. Al-
lowing the monetary authority to respond to the asset price gap is again
beneﬁcial. Such a policy further dampens asset price movements as well as
the movements in the external ﬁnance premium. Once again, such a policy
produces beneﬁts in terms of stabilizing output gap but comes at the cost
of destabilizing inﬂation.
Imperfect information magniﬁes the movements in the external ﬁnance
premium in response to persistent shocks to the growth rate of technology.
These magniﬁcation eﬀects are sizeable. For example, with a policy that re-
sponds strongly to inﬂation, the movement in the external ﬁnance pre-
mium is twice as large in the case of imperfect information (ﬁgure 2.10),
relative to the case of full information (ﬁgure 2.8). Because the private sec-
tor gives a relatively low initial weight to the probability that the increase
in technology growth is persistent, imperfect information implies a series
of positive shocks to expectations regarding future economic fundamen-
tals. Such positive surprises raise the ex post realized rate of return on cap-
ital, relative to the anticipated rate of return, and enhance entrepreneurial
net worth. These procyclical movements in net worth imply a strong hump-
shaped countercyclical response in the external ﬁnance premium as well as
a greater degree of procyclicality in asset prices than would be the case un-
der full information. Because the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism is
strengthened by imperfect information and learning on the part of the
private sector, we expect that the beneﬁts of allowing the monetary au-
thority to respond to asset prices, particularly in the form of reduction in
the volatility of the output gap, to be greater in the case of imperfect infor-
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14. The path labeled “RBC” in ﬁgure 2.9 is computed under full information.mation than in the case of full information.15 We now turn to stochastic
simulations to explore this issue further.
2.5 Stochastic Simulations
The previous section computed impulse response functions to technol-
ogy shocks under alternative monetary policy rules. These results suggest
potential beneﬁts to adopting a policy that implies a strong response to in-
ﬂation as well as to allowing the monetary authority to respond to the as-
set price gap—the gap between the observed asset prices and the potential
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15. To be precise, the validity of this statement depends on the relative importance of the
two types of shocks to technology growth. As we saw in this section, in response to a persis-
tent shock to technology growth, the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism is strengthened by im-
perfect information on the part of the private sector. As we saw in the second subsection of
section 2.4.1, in response to a transitory shock to technology growth, the eﬀect of informa-
tion structures on the strength of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism is relatively small.
Figure 2.9 Response to a persistent shock to technology growth (imperfect infor-
mation, no ﬁnancial accelerator)
Note: Weak: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   1.1 ln  t, Strong: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   2.0 ln  t, Asset: ln Rn
t 1  
ln Rn   2.0 ln  t 1.5(ln Qt – ln Qt
∗), RBC: Flexible-price model with full information and no ﬁ-
nancial market imperfections.level of asset prices that would occur in the ﬂexible-price economy without
ﬁnancial market imperfections. The extent of these beneﬁts depends on the
degree of ﬁnancial market imperfections and the information structure of
the economy. To further explore these issues, we now conduct stochastic
simulations of the various models considered. The stochastic simulations
depend on the combined eﬀect of both transitory and persistent shocks to
technology growth. When conducting such simulations, we parameterize
the technology shock process in the manner described in our calibration.
2.5.1 Beneﬁts of Responding Strongly to Inﬂation
We ﬁrst consider the beneﬁts to adopting a policy that responds strongly
to inﬂation. As Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) and Gilchrist and
Leahy (2002) have emphasized, most of the destabilizing eﬀects of asset
price ﬂuctuations on the aggregate activity can be eliminated using such a
rule. The results emphasized in Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) are de-
rived in an environment where exogenous movements in asset prices
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Figure 2.10 Response to a persistent shock to technology growth (imperfect infor-
mation, ﬁnancial accelerator)
Note: Weak: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   1.1 ln  t, Strong: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   2.0 ln  t, Asset: ln Rn
t 1  
ln Rn   2.0 ln  t 1.5(ln Qt – ln Qt
∗), RBC: Flexible-price model with full information and no ﬁ-
nancial market imperfections.(bubbles) provide an additional source of ﬂuctuations in net worth. These
bubbles do not alter entrepreneurs’ perceptions regarding the value of new
investment in their framework, however.
In our environment, misperceptions regarding the future technology
growth cause ﬂuctuations in asset values. These misperceptions also inﬂu-
ence investment demand. We wish to consider whether the policy pre-
scription of responding strongly to inﬂation is robust to the information
environment that we consider. To do so, we compare economic outcomes
under the two alternative monetary policy rules—a policy rule that implies
a weak response to inﬂation:
(37) lnRn
t 1   lnRn   1.1 ln t,
and a policy rule that implies a strong response to inﬂation:
(38) lnRn
t 1   lnRn   2.0 ln t.
To compute the beneﬁts of various policy rules, we use stochastic model
simulations to compute the variance of both the output gap and inﬂation,
where the potential level of output, Y
∗
full, is deﬁned as the level of output
that would prevail in the ﬂexible-price economy without ﬁnancial market
imperfections but with full information about the shocks to technology
growth. We also compute a loss function based on a weighted average of
the variance of the output gap and the variance of inﬂation:16
(39) Loss   0.5var(lnY   lnY
∗
full)   0.5var( ).
We report the results of these simulations in table 2.1.
The ﬁrst two rows of table 2.1 consider an environment where the private
sector has full information regarding the state of technology growth. For
comparison purposes, we provide results for the model without the ﬁnan-
cial accelerator as well as the model with the ﬁnancial accelerator. The
variance of the output gap and inﬂation are reported in percentage points
on a quarterly basis.
Responding strongly to inﬂation provides substantial beneﬁts in both
the economy with and without the ﬁnancial accelerator. Without the ﬁ-
nancial accelerator, moving from a weak to strong response to inﬂation im-
plies large reductions in the variance of both the output gap and inﬂation.
In fact, under the policy of responding strongly to inﬂation, the variance of
the output gap is very close to zero (0.006). The variance of inﬂation is also
very small (0.044). This result is consistent with our observation from the
impulse response experiments that, in the absence of the ﬁnancial acceler-
ator, the sticky-price model under the policy of responding strongly to in-
ﬂation comes very close to reproducing the frictionless RBC outcome.
In the economy with the ﬁnancial accelerator, we also see substantial
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16. For simplicity, we report the results only for the equal-weighted loss.beneﬁts to a policy that responds strongly to inﬂation. Both the output gap
and inﬂation volatility are reduced with such a policy. Nonetheless, with
the ﬁnancial accelerator, output gap volatility is still signiﬁcant (0.470) rel-
ative to the baseline sticky-price model (0.006). This ﬁnding reinforces the
intuition that the model with the ﬁnancial accelerator has two distor-
tions—one on the markup and one on the return on capital. A policy of re-
sponding strongly to inﬂation does well at reducing the distortion owing to
variation in the markup, but does not eliminate the distortion on the return
on capital. The presence of this distortion causes an increase in output gap
volatility.
We now consider the role of imperfect information regarding the state of
technology growth. These results are reported in the second two rows of
table 2.1. Imperfect information implies an increase in the variance of the
output gap and a reduction in the variance of inﬂation.17 Under the policy
of responding weakly to inﬂation, the equal-weighted loss is actually lower
with imperfect information than under full information. Because the pol-
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17. The result that the variance of the output gap is larger under imperfect information than
under full information on the part of the private sector can be explained by the fact that, when
computing the variance of the output gap, we deﬁne the potential level of output as the level
of output in the frictionless economy with full information. Under imperfect information on
the part of the private sector, the equilibrium level of output deviates from such a full-
information level. The result that the variance of inﬂation is smaller under imperfect infor-
mation can be understood by considering the strength of the wealth eﬀect of shocks to tech-
nology growth on consumption, which constitutes a large component of the aggregate
demand. Under full information, wealth eﬀect on consumption is larger when a movement in
technology growth is persistent than when it is transitory. Under imperfect information, our
calibration of the Kalman gain parameter (  0.06138) implies that the private sector ini-
tially infers that observed movements in technology growth is mostly transitory, even when
these movements are, in fact, generated by a shock to the persistent component of technology
growth. The overall wealth eﬀect of technology growth movements on consumption, includ-
ing the eﬀects of both transitory and persistent shocks (which occur with the same frequency),
is thus smaller under imperfect information than under full information.
Table 2.1 Beneﬁts of responding strongly to inﬂation
No ﬁnancial accelerator Financial accelerator
var(Y gap) var(ln  ) Loss var(Y gap) var(ln  ) Loss
Full information for the private sector
     1.1 0.431 2.811 1.621 1.923 3.022 2.473
     2.0 0.006 0.044 0.025 0.470 0.056 0.263
Imperfect information for the private sector
     1.1 0.579 2.103 1.341 2.247 2.265 2.256
     2.0 0.099 0.028 0.063 0.870 0.045 0.458
Notes: The policy rule is ln Rn





full is the ﬂexible-price equilibrium level of output in the absence of ﬁnancial frictions and
under full information. The loss is deﬁned as 0.5var(Y gap)   0.5var(ln  ).icy of responding strongly to inﬂation is clearly the dominant policy, it pro-
vides the more relevant comparison, however.
With the monetary policy that responds strongly to inﬂation, in the
model without the ﬁnancial accelerator, the presence of imperfect infor-
mation has only a small eﬀect on the variance of the output gap and inﬂa-
tion. In the model with the ﬁnancial accelerator, imperfect information
leads to a large increase in output gap volatility with very little reduction in
the variance of inﬂation. As a result, with the ﬁnancial accelerator, the loss
is substantially higher under imperfect information (0.458) than under full
information (0.263).
2.5.2 Beneﬁts of Responding to the Asset Price Gap
We now consider whether a monetary policy that allows the nominal in-
terest rate to respond to the asset price gap can improve upon a policy that
responds to inﬂation only.18
Because we have already shown that a policy of responding strongly to
inﬂation is beneﬁcial, we restrict our attention to the case where the mon-
etary authority responds strongly to inﬂation and then consider the addi-
tional gains from responding to the asset price gap:
(40) lnRn
t 1   lnRn   2.0ln t    Q(lnQt   lnQt
∗).
We report results varying the coeﬃcient on the asset price gap,  Q, from 0.1
to 2.0.
An important question in this analysis is how to gauge the beneﬁts of
one policy relative to another. Because there is a consensus in the literature
that there are substantial gains to conducting a policy that responds
strongly to inﬂation, we use these gains as the relevant benchmark. In par-
ticular, table 2.2 reports the diﬀerence between outcomes obtained from
pursuing policy in equation (40) versus the policy of responding weakly to
inﬂation in equation (37), divided by the diﬀerence between outcomes ob-
tained from pursuing the policy of responding strongly to inﬂation in equa-
tion (38) versus the policy of responding weakly to inﬂation. For example,
when computing the relative gain of adopting Policy Rule x in terms of the
equal-weighted loss, we compute
(41) Relative gain(Policy Rule x)
  .
Loss(weak inﬂation response)   Loss(Policy Rule x)
       
Loss(weak inﬂation response)   Loss(strong inﬂation response)
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18. Although not reported here, the output gap serves a similar role as the asset price gap:
in the presence of ﬁnancial market imperfections, allowing the monetary authority to re-
spond to changes in the output gap in addition to responding strongly to inﬂation is beneﬁ-
cial, especially when the policymaker has full information. An interesting future direction of
this line of research is to study economic environments in which the asset price gap plays a
diﬀerent role from the output gap.We compute the relative gain for the reduction in output gap variance and
inﬂation variance in an analogous manner. Doing so enables us to easily
summarize the results: if the relative gain is above one, the policy in ques-
tion provides gains relative to the policy of responding strongly to inﬂa-
tion. If the relative gain is negative, the policy in question provides out-
comes that are strictly worse than those under the policy of responding
weakly to inﬂation.19
In imperfect information environments, the policymaker may not have
suﬃcient information to correctly compute the potential level of asset
prices Qt
∗. We thus distinguish between cases where the policymaker can
correctly assess the state of technology growth (Qt
∗   Q
∗
full,t) and the case
where the policymaker infers it based on current and past observations of
technology growth (Qt
∗   Q
∗
imp,t).
When considering the beneﬁts of such rules, we distinguish between en-
vironments where the private sector has full and imperfect information.
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19. Note that we cannot directly compare the numbers for the relative gain in the case of
imperfect information for the private sector and in the case of full information for the private
sector because the gain from moving from the policy of responding weakly to inﬂation to the
policy of responding strongly to inﬂation (the denominator in the formula to calculate the rel-
ative gain in equation [41]) diﬀers depending on the information structure for the private
sector.
Table 2.2 Beneﬁts of responding to the asset price gap (full information for the
private sector)
No ﬁnancial accelerator Financial accelerator
var(Y gap) var(ln  ) Loss var(Y gap) var(ln  ) Loss
Full information for the policymaker
 Q   0.1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.01 1.01
 Q   0.5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.01 1.04
 Q   1.0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.13 0.98 1.03
 Q   1.5 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.17 0.95 1.02
 Q   2.0 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.22 0.92 1.02
Imperfect information for the policymaker
 Q   0.1 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.01 1.01
 Q   0.5 0.85 1.00 0.98 0.97 1.00 0.99
 Q   1.0 0.59 0.99 0.94 0.93 0.98 0.97
 Q   1.5 0.31 1.00 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.94
 Q   2.0 0.21 1.00 0.90 0.79 0.88 0.85
Notes: The policy rule is ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   2.0 ln  t    Q(ln Qt – ln Qt





fullis the ﬂexible-price equilibrium level of output in the absence of ﬁnan-
cial frictions and under full information. The loss is deﬁned as 0.5var(Y gap)   0.5var(ln  ). 
A value of larger than one implies that the policy is better than the policy that responds
strongly to inﬂation. A negative value implies that the policy is worse than the policy that re-
sponds weakly to inﬂation.Thus, our information structure allows for four cases: (1) full information
on the part of both the private sector and the policymaker; (2) full infor-
mation for the private sector but imperfect information for the policy-
maker; (3) imperfect information for the private sector and full informa-
tion for the policymaker; and (4) imperfect information for both. Within
these four cases, we report results for the model with and without the ﬁ-
nancial accelerator.
Full Information for the Private Sector
We ﬁrst consider the case of full information on the part of the private
sector (table 2.2). The top rows of table 2.2 consider the case where the pol-
icymaker also has full information. In the sticky-price model without the
ﬁnancial accelerator, the relative gain is approximately unity.20 Thus, there
are almost no gains to allowing the monetary authority to respond to the
asset price gap relative to the policy that responds strongly to inﬂation. By
responding strongly to inﬂation, the monetary authority succeeds in stabi-
lizing the markup, which is the only distortion in the economy. With the
markup stabilized, the actual path for asset prices is nearly identical to the
path under ﬂexible prices, so giving weight to the asset price gap provides
almost no gain.
In contrast, in the model with the ﬁnancial accelerator, responding to
the asset price gap provides clear gains in terms of output gap stabiliza-
tion—on the order of 22 percent when the coeﬃcient on the asset price gap
is relatively large, with  Q   2.0. Although the policy that responds
strongly to inﬂation stabilizes the markup, it does not eliminate the distor-
tion due to ﬁnancial market imperfections, which is reﬂected in the devia-
tions of asset prices from the potential level that arises in the economy
without pricing and ﬁnancial frictions. Thus, responding to the asset price
gap helps reduce distortions due to ﬁnancial market imperfections. As the
coeﬃcient on the asset price gap is increased, the variance of the output
gap falls but the variance of inﬂation rises. Based on the loss function in
equation (39), which gives equal weight on the output gap and inﬂation,
our parameterization implies a modest gain to responding to the asset
price gap, with a coeﬃcient on the asset price gap 0.1    Q   1.0 minimiz-
ing this loss.
We now consider the case where the private sector has full information,
but the policymaker has imperfect information. These results are reported
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20. To deemphasize small diﬀerences in simulation results that may reﬂect sensitivity to a
numerical solution or a simulation error, we report the relative gains rounded to the second
decimal place. Our actual results suggest that the model exhibits an extremely small but pos-
itive gain to allowing the monetary authority to respond to the asset price gap in the case of
full information and no ﬁnancial accelerator. The relative gains are always less than 1.005,
however, implying that to a ﬁrst approximation the absolute gains to allowing the policy-
maker to respond to the asset price gap are zero.in the bottom rows of table 2.2. In the sticky-price model without the ﬁ-
nancial accelerator, responding to the asset price gap is a strictly inferior
policy, which leads to large increases in the variance of the output gap and
inﬂation. In this environment, the potential level of asset prices measured
by the monetary authority is no longer correct, and putting weight on the
asset price gap pushes the economy away from the frictionless RBC out-
come that is attainable under the policy of responding strongly to inﬂation.
With the ﬁnancial accelerator, there is a small gain to allowing a very weak
policy response to the asset price gap ( Q   0.1), but a deterioration in
terms of the variance of output gap and inﬂation for larger coeﬃcients.
When the monetary authority has imperfect information, it responds to
the wrong measure of the asset price gap, which oﬀsets any potential gains
to be achieved relative to the policy that responds strongly to inﬂation only.
Imperfect Information for the Private Sector
We now consider the case where the private sector has imperfect infor-
mation (table 2.3). We again begin with the case where the policymaker has
full information. In the sticky-price model without the ﬁnancial accelera-
tor, allowing the monetary authority to respond to the asset price gap pro-
duces a small gain in terms of reducing the variance of the output gap.
These gains are no longer present when the monetary authority also has
imperfect information, however. In the absence of ﬁnancial frictions, there
are unlikely to be signiﬁcant gains to allowing the monetary authority to
respond to the asset price gap, even in the case where the private sector has
imperfect information.
In the model with the ﬁnancial accelerator, the gains to responding to
the asset price gap are substantial. If the policymaker has full information,
adopting a rule that responds to the asset price gap produces an incremen-
tal reduction in the variance of the output gap of 50 percent when  Q 1.0.
Allowing the monetary authority to respond to the asset price gap reduces
the variance of the output gap, but increases the variance of inﬂation.
Overall, we see an improvement as measured by the equal-weighted loss,
however.
When the policymaker has imperfect information, the gains obtained
from responding to the asset price gap are somewhat smaller than the case
where it has full information. Nonetheless, the gains are still positive and
economically interesting. When the private sector has imperfect informa-
tion, output gap volatility is increased relative to the case of full informa-
tion (table 2.1). Because allowing the monetary authority to respond to the
asset price gap reduces distortions arising from ﬁnancial market imperfec-
tions and thus reduces the output variability, the overall gains from re-
sponding to the asset price gap are larger when the private sector has im-
perfect information relative to the case where it has full information. These
larger gains oﬀset the loss associated with the fact that the policymaker is
82 Simon Gilchrist and Masashi Saitoresponding to the “wrong” asset price gap. As a result, when the private
sector has imperfect information, allowing the policymaker to respond to
the asset price gap can be beneﬁcial even when the policymaker also has
imperfect information.
In summary, the results from tables 2.2 and 2.3 imply that there are gains
associated with responding to the asset price gap in the presence of distor-
tions in the return on capital caused by ﬁnancial market imperfections.
These gains are greatest when the private sector has imperfect information
and the policymaker is fully informed about future economic fundamen-
tals. Nonetheless, there are also gains from responding to the asset price gap
when both the private sector and the policymaker have imperfect informa-
tion. Finally, when choosing how to respond, the policymaker faces a trade
oﬀ—increasing the coeﬃcient on the asset price gap in the monetary policy
rule reduces output gap volatility but increases inﬂation volatility.
2.5.3 Eﬀects of Allowing a Policy Response to the Natural Rate
We now consider the robustness of the results in the previous subsection
to allowing the policymaker to respond to movements in the natural rate of
interest.21 We consider the following interest rate rule:
(42) lnRn
t 1   lnR
∗




t 1 is the natural rate of interest that prevails between period t and
period t   1. The natural rate of interest is deﬁned here as the real interest
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21. We thank Michael Woodford for suggesting this line of extension.
Table 2.3 Beneﬁts of responding to the asset price gap (imperfect information for
the private sector)
No ﬁnancial accelerator Financial accelerator
var(Y gap) var(ln  ) Loss var(Y gap) var(ln  ) Loss
Full information for the policymaker
 Q   0.1 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.09 1.00 1.04
 Q   0.5 1.11 0.99 1.01 1.36 1.00 1.14
 Q   1.0 1.12 0.99 1.01 1.50 0.98 1.18
 Q   1.5 1.06 0.99 1.00 1.51 0.93 1.16
 Q   2.0 0.97 0.99 0.99 1.53 0.86 1.12
Imperfect information for the policymaker
 Q   0.1 0.92 1.00 0.98 1.20 1.01 1.08
 Q   0.5 0.94 1.00 0.99 1.22 1.01 1.09
 Q   1.0 0.96 1.00 0.99 1.38 0.97 1.12
 Q   1.5 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.44 0.93 1.12
 Q   2.0 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.42 0.87 1.08
Notes: See table 2.2 notes.rate that supports the eﬃcient allocation in the economy in the absence of
both the pricing and ﬁnancial frictions. It is computed based on the infor-
mation available to the policymaker. We ﬁx the coeﬃcient on inﬂation in
the policy rule at 2.0 and consider various values for the coeﬃcient on the
asset price gap,  Q.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 summarize the results. Table 2.4 considers the case of
full information for the private sector, and table 2.5 considers the case of
imperfect information for the private sector. As in tables 2.2 and 2.3, we re-
port the gains from adopting a policy that implies a response to the natu-
ral rate of interest and the asset price gap as well as a strong response to in-
ﬂation, relative to the gains from adopting a policy of responding strongly
to inﬂation only.
When the policymaker has full information, allowing the policymaker to
respond to movements in the natural rate of interest reduces the variability
of both inﬂation and the output gap because the policymaker in this case
computes the natural rate of interest correctly.
The eﬀects of allowing the monetary authority to respond to movements
in the natural rate of interest diﬀer greatly depending on whether the ﬁ-
nancial accelerator is present. Without ﬁnancial market imperfections, al-
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Table 2.4 Eﬀects of allowing a policy response to the natural rate (full information
for the private sector)
No ﬁnancial accelerator Financial accelerator
var(Y gap) var(ln  ) Loss var(Y gap) var(ln  ) Loss
Full information for the policymaker
 Q   0 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.09 1.02 1.04
 Q   0.1 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.11 1.02 1.05
 Q   0.5 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.16 1.01 1.05
 Q   1.0 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.20 0.98 1.05
 Q   1.5 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.23 0.94 1.03
 Q   2.0 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.25 0.88 1.00
Imperfect information for the policymaker
 Q   0 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.08 0.97 1.03
 Q   0.1 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.05 1.01 1.02
 Q   0.5 0.87 1.00 0.98 1.04 1.00 1.01
 Q   1.0 0.61 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.97 0.98
 Q   1.5 0.40 1.00 0.92 0.96 0.93 0.94
 Q   2.0 0.12 1.01 0.89 0.88 0.86 0.87
Notes: The policy rule is ln Rn
t 1   ln R
∗
t 1   2.0 ln  t    Q(ln Qt – ln Qt





fullis the ﬂexible-price equilibrium level of output in the absence of ﬁnan-
cial frictions and under full information. The loss is deﬁned as 0.5var(Y gap)   0.5var(ln  ). 
A value of larger than one implies that the policy is better than the policy that responds
strongly to inﬂation. A negative value implies that the policy is worse than the policy that re-
sponds weakly to inﬂation.lowing the monetary authority with full information to respond to move-
ments in the natural rate of interest almost completely eliminates the only
distortion in the economy arising from the pricing frictions. In this situa-
tion, allowing the policymaker to respond to the asset price gap provides
little gain. In the presence of the ﬁnancial accelerator, allowing the mone-
tary authority to respond to movements in the natural rate of interest tends
to reduce distortions arising from both pricing and ﬁnancial frictions. This
is because the natural rate of interest is deﬁned as the rate of interest that
arises in the absence of both pricing and ﬁnancial frictions.22 In this situa-
tion, we still observe gains from allowing the monetary authority to re-
spond to the asset price gap, but those gains are smaller relative to the case
where the policy rule does not include a response to the natural rate of in-
terest.
2.5.4 Policy Rules That Do Not Require Inferences
Monetary policy rules that allow the policymaker to respond to the as-
set price gap require inferences regarding the true state of technology
growth. Because these policies are not necessarily robust to incorrect in-
ference on the part of the policymaker, it is also useful to consider mone-
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22. A diﬀerent deﬁnition of the natural rate of interest would lead to somewhat diﬀerent
conclusions. For instance, if one deﬁnes the natural rate of interest as the interest rate in the
absence of pricing frictions but in the presence ﬁnancial frictions, allowing the monetary au-
thority to respond to movements in the natural rate would have a smaller impact on the dis-
tortions arising from ﬁnancial frictions.
Table 2.5 Eﬀects of allowing a policy response to the natural rate (imperfect
information for the private sector)
No ﬁnancial accelerator Financial accelerator
var(Y gap) var(ln  ) Loss var(Y gap) var(ln  ) Loss
Full information for the policymaker
 Q   0 1.04 1.01 1.01 1.27 1.01 1.11
 Q   0.1 1.10 1.00 1.02 1.32 1.01 1.13
 Q   0.5 1.16 0.99 1.03 1.44 0.99 1.16
 Q   1.0 1.13 0.99 1.02 1.49 0.95 1.16
 Q   1.5 1.04 0.99 1.00 1.51 0.89 1.13
 Q   2.0 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.51 0.83 1.09
Imperfect information for the policymaker
 Q   0 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.19 1.02 1.09
 Q   0.1 1.03 1.01 1.02 1.26 1.02 1.11
 Q   0.5 0.98 1.01 1.01 1.39 1.00 1.15
 Q   1.0 0.98 1.01 1.01 1.39 0.95 1.12
 Q   1.5 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.42 0.90 1.10
 Q   2.0 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.43 0.86 1.08
Notes: See table 2.4 notes.tary policy rules that do not require the monetary authority to make infer-
ences. We consider three such rules:
1. Policy rule with output growth:
(43) lnRn
t 1   lnRn   2.0ln t    Y(lnYt   lnYt 1    ).
2. Policy rule with asset price growth:
(44) lnRn
t 1   lnRn   2.0ln t    Q(lnQt   lnQt 1).
3. Policy rule with the level of asset prices:
(45) lnRn
t 1   lnRn   2.0ln t    Q(lnQt   lnQ),
where Q is the nonstochastic steady-state level of asset prices (Q   1 under
our speciﬁcation of the capital adjustment cost function).
Table 2.6 and table 2.7 report the relative gains from adopting these pol-
icy rules in the case where the private sector has full and imperfect infor-
mation, respectively.
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Table 2.6 Policy rules that do not require inferences (full information for the private
sector)
No ﬁnancial accelerator Financial accelerator
var(Y gap) var(ln  ) Loss var(Y gap) var(ln  ) Loss
Policy with output growth: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   2.0 ln  t    Y(ln Yt – ln Yt – 1 –  )
 Y   0.1 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.01 1.01
 Y   0.5 0.85 1.01 0.99 1.04 1.01 1.02
 Y   1.0 0.57 1.00 0.95 1.04 1.01 1.02
 Y   1.5 0.23 0.98 0.88 0.97 0.99 0.98
 Y   2.0 –0.05 0.94 0.81 0.83 0.95 0.91
Policy with asset price growth: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   2.0 ln  t    Q(ln Qt – ln Qt–1)
 Q   0.1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.07 1.00 1.02
 Q   0.5 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.00 1.02
 Q   1.0 0.87 1.00 0.99 1.04 1.00 1.02
 Q   1.5 0.78 1.00 0.97 1.02 1.00 1.01
 Q   2.0 0.69 1.00 0.96 0.96 1.00 0.99
Policy with the level of asset prices: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   2.0 ln  t    Q(ln Qt – ln Q)
 Q   0.1 0.99 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01
 Q   0.5 0.71 0.70 0.70 1.10 0.73 0.85
 Q   1.0 0.13 –0.01 0.00 1.05 –0.31 0.13
 Q   1.5 –0.78 –1.57 –1.46 0.91 –1.98 –1.03
 Q   2.0 –2.16 –3.60 –3.41 0.71 –4.18 –2.57




full is the ﬂexible-price equilibrium level of
output in the absence of ﬁnancial frictions and under full information. The loss is deﬁned as
0.5var(Y gap)   0.5var(ln  ). A value of larger than one implies that the policy is better than
the policy that responds strongly to inﬂation. A negative value implies that the policy is worse
than the policy that responds weakly to inﬂation.In the absence of ﬁnancial market imperfections, none of these policies
provide substantial gains relative to the policy of responding strongly to in-
ﬂation. Policies that respond to either output growth or asset price growth
lead to an increase in the variance of the output gap, but have little impact
on the variance of inﬂation. This is true under either full or imperfect in-
formation on the part of the private sector. In the absence of ﬁnancial fric-
tions, the policy of responding strongly to inﬂation does well at reducing
variation in the markup, which is the only source of distortions. As a con-
sequence, there is little to be gained from adding additional variables to in-
terest rate rules.
In the presence of ﬁnancial market imperfections, policies based on ei-
ther output growth or asset price growth provide beneﬁts relative to the
policy of responding strongly to inﬂation. In relative terms, these beneﬁts
are much larger when the private sector has imperfect information regard-
ing the state of technology growth. Depending on the coeﬃcient values,
these policies can do as well as policies based on the asset price gap. Be-
cause these policies do not require the policymaker to make inferences re-
garding the underlying potential of the economy, they are arguably more
robust than policies based on the asset price gap.
Finally, we consider the policy rule that includes the level of the asset
prices. This policy rule has been considered in the previous literature, but
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Table 2.7 Policy rules that do not require inferences (imperfect information for the
private sector)
No ﬁnancial accelerator Financial accelerator
var(Y gap) var(ln  ) Loss var(Y gap) var(ln  ) Loss
Policy with output growth: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   2.0 ln  t    Y(ln Yt – ln Yt – 1 –  )
 Y   0.1 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.20 1.01 1.08
 Y   0.5 0.90 1.01 0.99 1.40 1.02 1.16
 Y   1.0 0.74 1.00 0.95 1.40 1.01 1.16
 Y   1.5 0.54 0.96 0.88 1.40 0.98 1.14
 Y   2.0 0.33 0.90 0.79 1.37 0.92 1.24
Policy with asset price growth: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   2.0 ln  t    Q(ln Qt – ln Qt – 1)
 Q   0.1 0.95 1.00 0.99 1.11 1.00 1.05
 Q   0.5 0.93 1.00 0.99 1.15 1.00 1.06
 Q   1.0 0.96 1.00 0.99 1.33 1.00 1.13
 Q   1.5 0.92 1.00 0.99 1.31 1.00 1.12
 Q   2.0 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.39 1.00 1.15
Policy with the level of asset prices: ln Rn
t 1   ln Rn   2.0 ln  t    Q(ln Qt – ln Q)
 Q   0.1 0.96 1.01 1.00 1.21 1.02 1.09
 Q   0.5 0.91 0.61 0.66 1.44 0.61 0.93
 Q   1.0 0.49 –0.65 –0.44 1.52 –0.80 0.09
 Q   1.5 0.13 –1.86 –1.49 1.48 –2.49 –0.97
 Q   2.0 –0.78 –4.54 –3.83 1.30 –5.42 –2.85
Notes: See table 2.6 notes.studies such as Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) and Gilchrist and Leahy
(2002) have argued against it. Here we conﬁrm their results, albeit for
somewhat diﬀerent reasons. When the private sector has imperfect infor-
mation, allowing a policy response to the level of asset prices provides clear
beneﬁts in terms of reducing output gap volatility in the model with the ﬁ-
nancial accelerator. It also leads, however, to a large increase in inﬂation
volatility. For coeﬃcients on the level of asset prices above 0.5, the inﬂation
outcome is actually worse than what is obtained under the policy of re-
sponding weakly to inﬂation. This policy does not allow the monetary au-
thority to adjust its policy owing to movements in asset prices that reﬂect
changes in the desired level of investment spending in the frictionless econ-
omy. Because asset prices are procyclical on average in the frictionless
economy, responding to the observed level of asset prices itself implies a
strongly countercyclical policy that leads to signiﬁcant deﬂation in expan-
sionary environments. This deﬂationary response can be limited by adopt-
ing a policy that responds to either the asset price gap or the growth rate of
asset prices.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter considers the design of monetary policy rule in an environ-
ment where both the private sector and the monetary authority learn about
the trend growth rate of technology. In the presence of ﬁnancial market im-
perfections resulting from asymmetric information between lenders and
borrowers, shocks to the economy that cause increases in asset prices im-
prove the balance-sheet conditions of borrowers, reduce the external ﬁ-
nance premium, and amplify the response of real economic activity. This
ampliﬁcation mechanism—the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism—repre-
sents a distortion in underlying economic activity that can only partially be
eliminated by a policy of responding strongly to inﬂation. Such a policy
stabilizes inﬂation but leaves a relatively large variability in the output gap.
In this environment, because ﬂuctuations in asset prices are closely linked
to the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism, allowing the monetary authority
to respond to the asset price gap—the gap between the observed asset
prices and the potential level of asset prices that arises in the frictionless
economy with ﬂexible prices and no ﬁnancial market imperfections—sta-
bilizes the output gap but tends to increase the variability in inﬂation.
We also show that the overall gains from allowing the monetary author-
ity to respond to the asset price gap are greatest when the monetary au-
thority can correctly identify the true state of technology growth, while the
private sector must infer it from past observations of technology growth.
These gains are reduced to the extent that the monetary authority is also
imperfectly informed about the state of technology growth. We further
show that policy rules that respond to either the growth rate of asset prices
or the growth rate of output provide most of the beneﬁts associated with
88 Simon Gilchrist and Masashi Saitoincluding the asset price gap in the monetary policy rule. Because it is eﬃ-
cient that asset prices ﬂuctuate in the presence of shocks to technology
growth, monetary policies that respond to the observed level of asset prices
itself, and hence do not take into account changes in the potential level of
asset prices, are particularly detrimental, however.
This chapter focuses on a quadratic loss function rather than formal wel-
fare analysis in evaluating economic outcomes under diﬀerent monetary
policy rules. Thus, future work should be oriented toward assessing the ro-
bustness of our conclusions for welfare calculations. In addition, although
learning combined with the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism increases the
procyclicality in asset prices as well as the extent to which asset prices de-
viate from the potential level, our underlying frictionless economy implies
a fall in asset prices in response to a persistent increase in technology
growth. We are, therefore, also interested in exploring the robustness of our
conclusions to alternative mechanisms that may provide a more realistic
characterization of the link between asset prices and changes in expecta-
tions or news regarding future economic fundamentals.
Appendix
Equilibrium Conditions in Normalized Variables
This section lists the equilibrium conditions for the model in terms of the
normalized, stationary variables.
We normalize the levels of consumption, investment, output, capital
stock, and net worth by the level of technology so that these real quantities
are stationary:
ct   , it   , yt   , kt   , and nt   .
Kt and Nt are determined in period t – 1, and we normalize these variables
by the level of technology in period t – 1. Also, let








The equilibrium conditions in terms of the normalized variables are as
follows.
Consumption savings:
(A1)    Et  Rn
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(A2) EtRk
t 1   ,
where mct   Pt
W/Pt is the real marginal cost.
Deﬁnition of the external ﬁnance premium:
The external ﬁnance premium is deﬁned as the ratio of the expected real
rate of return on capital (which is equal to the cost of external funds in
equilibrium) to the expected real rate of return on the riskless bond (which
is interpreted as the cost of internal funds):
(A3) st   .
Determination of the external ﬁnance premium:







1   
 
.
Evolution of net worth:
Under our calibration of   0,
nt+1    Rt
kQt 1kt   Et 1Rt
k Qt 1kt   nt   .




(A5) nt 1    Rt
kQt 1kt   st 1Et 1  Rt
n    Qt 1kt   nt   .
Investment-Q relationship:
(A6) Qt   .
Aggregate resource constraint:
Under our calibration of Ct
e   0 and Gt   0,
(A7) yt   ct   it.
Production function:
Under our calibration of   0,
(A8) yt   Ht
 kt



















































 Zt 1mct 1   (1    )Qt 1 
     
Qt
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(A9)  Ht











∗   ,
where MCt   Ptmct   Pt
W is the nominal marginal cost of retail goods pro-
duction.
Price index:
(A11) Pt   [υPt 1
1 ε   (1   υ)(Pt
∗)1 ε]1/(1 ε).
Capital accumulation:
(A12) kt 1   kt (1    )     Zt kt .
Policy rule with inﬂation only:
Rn
t 1   Rn t
  .
Policy rule with the asset price gap:
Rn
t 1   Rn t




∗is the ﬂexible-price equilibrium level of asset prices in the absence
of ﬁnancial frictions. Qt
∗is computed under the information available to the
policymaker.
Policy rule with the natural rate of interest and the asset price gap:
Rn
t 1   R
∗
t 1 t





t 1 is the natural rate of interest that is deﬁned as the real interest
rate that supports the eﬃcient allocation in the economy without pricing
and ﬁnancial frictions. R
∗
t 1is computed under the information available to
the policymaker.
Policy rule with output growth:
Rn
t 1   Rn t
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Rn
t 1   Rn t
    
 
Q.
Policy rule with the level of asset prices:
Rn
t 1   Rn t
    
 
Q,
where Q is the nonstochastic steady-state level of asset prices.
Technology shock process:
lnZt    t   εt,
and
( t    )    d( t 1    )   υt,
with εt ~ i.i.d.N(0,  ε
2) and υt ~ i.i.d.N(0,  2
υ).
Nonstochastic Steady State
This section lists the conditions for the nonstochastic steady state of the
economy in terms of the normalized variables.
Let
 t  
denote inﬂation.
Normalize the steady-state inﬂation at 0 percent.
  1.
We specify the capital adjustment cost function such that in the nonsto-
chastic steady state, we have
Q   1.
From equation (A10),
mc   .
From equation (A1) and   1,
Rn   .
Using equations (A3) and (A4) and Q   1, the nonstochastic steady-
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,
where the parameter   and the steady-state ratio of capital to net worth, 
k/n, are calibrated as described in the text.
From equation (A5),
 Rk   1.
Note that Rk must also satisfy the preceding condition, Rk/Rn   (k/n) .
From equation (A2),
  [Rk   (1    )].
From equation (A12),
  1   (1    ).
From equation (A7),








k   .
Then,


































































Expectations, Asset Prices, and Monetary Policy: The Role of Learning 93Log-Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
This section lists the equilibrium conditions in terms of log deviations in
the normalized variables from the nonstochastic steady state.
Let z ˜t denote the percentage deviation in technology growth from the
mean:
z ˜t   lnZt    .
Consumption-savings:
 c ˜t    Etc ˜t 1   Etz ˜t 1   r ˜n
t 1   Et  ˜ t 1.
Expected real rate of return on capital:
Etr ˜ k
t 1   (Ety ˜t 1   k ˜
t 1   Etz ˜t 1   Etm ˜ct 1) 
  Etq ˜t 1   q ˜t.
Deﬁnition of the external ﬁnance premium:
s ˜t   Etr ˜k
t 1   (r ˜n
t 1   Et  ˜ t 1).
Determination of the external ﬁnance premium:
s ˜t    (q ˜t   k ˜
t 1   n ˜t 1).
Evolution of net worth:
Using the steady-state condition  Rk/Z   1, net worth evolves accord-
ing to
n ˜t 1   r ˜ t
k      1 Et 1r ˜ t
k   n ˜t   z ˜t.
Or, using the deﬁnition of the external ﬁnance premium, Et–1r ˜t
k   s ˜t–1  
(r ˜t
n – Et–1  ˜t), we have
n ˜t 1   r ˜ t
k      1 (s ˜t 1   r ˜ t
n   Et 1   ˜ t)   n ˜t   z ˜t.
Investment-Q relationship:
q ˜t    k(i ˜
t   k ˜














1   
   
mc(1    ) 
k
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  Z   (1    )




   
mc(1    ) 
k
y
  Z   (1    )
94 Simon Gilchrist and Masashi Saito k     .
Aggregate resource constraint:
y ˜t   c ˜t   i ˜
t.
Production function:
y ˜t    h ˜
t   (1    )k ˜
t   (1    )z ˜t.
Labor market equilibrium condition:
y ˜t   m ˜ct   c ˜t   (1    )h ˜
t.
Inﬂation:
  ˜t   κm ˜ct    Et  ˜t 1,
where κ   (1 – υ)(1 –  υ)/υ.
Capital accumulation:
k ˜
t 1   (k ˜
t   z ˜t)   1    i ˜
t.
Policy rule with inﬂation only:
r ˜n
t 1       ˜ t.
Policy rule with the asset price gap:
r ˜n
t 1       ˜ t    Q (q ˜t   q ˜t
∗).
Policy rule with the natural rate of interest and the asset price gap:
r ˜n
t 1   r ˜
∗
t 1       ˜ t    Q(q ˜t   q ˜t
∗).
Policy rule with output growth:
r ˜n
t 1       ˜ t    Y (y ˜t   y ˜t 1   z ˜t).
Policy rule with asset price growth:
r ˜n
t 1       ˜ t    Q (q ˜t   q ˜t 1).
Policy rule with the level of asset prices:
r ˜n
t 1       ˜ t    Qq ˜t.
Technology shock process:
z ˜t   d ˜
t   εt,
1   
 
Z









 { ″[Z   (1    )] · [Z   (1    )]}
    
  [Z   (1    )]
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d ˜
t    dd ˜
t 1    t,
where d ˜
t is deﬁned as
d ˜
t   ( t    ).
Solution to the Model
This section describes the solution to the model.
When the Monetary Policy Rule Does Not Include the Asset Price Gap
and the Natural Rate of Interest
When the interest rate rule does not include the asset price gap and the
natural rate of interest, we do not need to compute the equilibrium in the
frictionless economy to characterize the equilibrium in the economy with
both pricing and ﬁnancial frictions.
When the Private Sector Has Full Information
The solution to the model takes the form:
(A13) Xt   B1Xt 1   B2ut,
where
Xt   [c ˜t; y ˜t; h ˜
t; i ˜
t; k ˜
t 1; n ˜t 1; r ˜t
k; s ˜t; r ˜n
t 1; q ˜t; m ˜ct;   ˜ t; d ˜
t],
and
ut   [ t; εt].
When the Private Sector Has Imperfect Information
We assume certainty equivalence. The solution under imperfect infor-
mation is characterized by the same coeﬃcients, B1and B2, as in the case of
full information. We replace the unobserved variables (d ˜
t–1,  t, εt) on the
right-hand side of the solution system in equation (A13) with inferences
(d ˜
t–1|t–1,  t|t, εt|t) that are determined by the following four equations. The
ﬁrst speciﬁes the process of the persistent component of technology
growth:
(A14) d ˜
t    dd ˜
t 1    t.
The second links the observed technology growth, z ˜t   (d ˜
t   εt ), to the
inference about the persistent component of technology growth, d ˜
t|t:
(A15) d ˜
t|t    1z ˜t   (1    1)  dd ˜
t 1|t 1
   1(d ˜
t   εt)   (1    1)  dd ˜
t 1|t 1,
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The third deﬁnes the inference of the private sector about the realization
of the shock to the persistent component of technology growth,  t|t:
(A16)  t|t   d ˜
t|t    dd ˜
t 1|t 1.
The fourth deﬁnes the inference of the private sector about the realiza-
tion of the shock to the transitory component of technology growth, εt|t:
(A17) εt|t   z ˜t   d ˜
t|t
  (d ˜
t   εt)   d ˜
t|t.
When the Monetary Policy Rule Includes the 
Asset Price Gap Or the Natural Rate of Interest
The solution described in the following concerns the case where the in-
terest rate rule includes the natural rate of interest or the asset price gap.
When Both the Private Sector and the Policymaker Have Full Information
The solution to the model takes the form:
(A18) Xt   B3Xt 1   B4ut,
where
Xt   [c ˜t; y ˜t; h ˜
t; i ˜
t; k ˜
t 1; n ˜t 1; r ˜ t
k; s ˜t; r ˜ n









t 1; n ˜
∗
t 1; r ˜ t
k*; s ˜t
∗; r ˜n*
t 1; q ˜t
∗; m ˜ct





ut   [ t; εt;  t
∗; εt
∗].
The variables with * denote those in the model without pricing and ﬁnan-
cial frictions, and the variables without * denote those in the model with
both frictions.23
When the Private Sector Has Full Information and 
the Policymaker Has Imperfect Information
The solution is characterized by the same coeﬃcients, B3and B4, as in the
case where both the private sector and the policymaker have full informa-
tion. We replace the unobserved variables (d ˜∗
t–1,  t
∗, εt
∗) on the right-hand






t|t) that are determined by the following four equations:
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23. When we compute the impulse response or conduct stochastic simulations, the shocks 
are common across the model with frictions and the model without frictions:  t    t
∗ and εt   εt
∗
for any period t.(A19) d ˜
t
∗    dd ˜∗




t|t    2z ˜t   (1    2) dd ˜∗
t 1|t 1
   2(d ˜
t
∗   εt
∗   (1    2) dd ˜∗
t 1|t 1,
where  2 is the Kalman gain that the policymaker uses, and
(A21)  
∗
t|t   d ˜ ∗





t|t   z ˜t   d ˜∗
t|t
  (d ˜
t
∗   εt
∗)   d ˜∗
t|t.
When Both the Private Sector and the Policymaker 
Have Imperfect Information
The solution is characterized by the same coeﬃcients, B3and B4, as in the
case where both the private sector and the policymaker have full informa-
tion. We replace the unobserved variables (d ˜




right-hand side of the solution system in equation (A18) with the infer-
ences of the private sector and the policymaker (d ˜






t|t) that are determined by the eight equations (A14) to (A17) and (A19) to
(A22). We assume that the private sector and the policymaker use the same
Kalman gain ( 1    2).
When the Private Sector Has Imperfect Information 
and the Policymaker Has Full Information
The solution is characterized by the same coeﬃcients (B3, B4) as in the
case where both the private sector and the policymaker have full informa-
tion. We replace the unobserved variables (d ˜
t–1,  t, εt) on the right-hand side
of the solution system in equation (A18) with the inferences of the private
sector (d ˜
t–1|t–1,  t|t, εt|t) that are determined by the four equations (A14) to
(A17).
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Discussion Summary
Lars E.O. Svensson suggested that as a general methodological point, it
would be natural to specify a loss function, and then to solve for the opti-
mal policy, resulting in an optimal reaction function. He argued that this
should be feasible because the model had a linear-quadratic structure. The
next question would then be how one could implement this optimal policy.
Starting from ad hoc rules, without checking whether they are close to op-
timal, approaches the problem from the wrong direction. Gilchrist re-
sponded that the authors appreciated the merits of this approach, but had
sought to work within the context of the previous literature, in particular,
the inﬂuential work of Bernanke and Gertler.
Stephen G. Cecchetti emphasized the importance of distinguishing be-
tween the loss function, which deﬁnes the target variables, and the reaction
100 Simon Gilchrist and Masashi Saitofunction, which deﬁnes the response of the policy interest rate in terms of
variables that need not themselves be target variables. For example, if asset
prices were included in the reaction function, this did not necessarily im-
ply that “asset price targeting” was taking place. Rather, it could reﬂect the
fact that responding to asset prices helped in targeting other variables that
entered the loss function.
Martin Schneider pointed out that in a linear model, one could always
solve for asset prices as a linear function of state variables. In principle,
therefore, the reaction function could be rewritten in terms of asset prices.
Although this was legitimate if the model was correctly speciﬁed, he said it
would be interesting to know the costs of doing so if the model was mis-
speciﬁed. Gilchrist responded that ideally one would have a model in
which asset prices were forward-looking and, therefore, captured informa-
tion that was not available elsewhere.
Tommaso Monacelli said that he had investigated the possibility of tar-
geting the leverage ratio with a coauthor. It did not matter whether the re-
action function was deﬁned in terms of the leverage ratio, or asset prices,
or inﬂation. The best outcome was obtained in all cases because the mea-
sures were all positively correlated. Gilchrist responded that in the frame-
work of his chapter with Saito, the objective function includes both stabil-
ity of inﬂation and stability of output. Because the model has two
distortions, to the markup and the return on capital, two instruments are
helpful to maximize the objective function. Inﬂation targeting enables pol-
icymakers to stabilize the markup, but targeting asset prices allows them to
stabilize the return on capital and, hence, to reduce the variance of output.
Donald L. Kohnsaid that informational assumptions are critical and that
policymakers learn about technological change from private-sector behav-
ior. In the 1990s, he pointed out, models of the economy used by Federal
Reserve Bank (FRB) staﬀhad failed and predicted inﬂation; he was, there-
fore, skeptical that central banks have an informational advantage over the
private sector. He said that the Fed would have been wrong to act on the
claim that there was “irrational exuberance” in the stock market in 1996
and that it was extremely hard to measure the potential asset price Q*.
Kohn also suggested that the role of leverage in the economy is compli-
cated. It was popularly suggested that central banks should look at credit,
but there had been a huge amount of ﬁnancial innovation and, hence,
credit expansion over the last twenty-ﬁve years. It would have been wrong
to respond to this. As a general point, he argued that ﬁnancial frictions are
diminishing over time and that asymmetric information is, therefore, be-
coming less of a problem. Gilchrist responded that although he agreed that
ﬁnancial markets are handling information asymmetries in a more sophis-
ticated fashion, the fact that people are taking on more leverage means that
there could be severe consequences if the ﬁnancial system were placed un-
der strain.
Expectations, Asset Prices, and Monetary Policy: The Role of Learning 101Andrew Levin was also skeptical about the assumption that central
bankers had more information than the private sector. He said that it was
extremely hard to project total factor productivity and that his view was
that the Fed’s task was to try to infer total factor productivity (TFP) from
information produced in the private sector. It was people in the private sec-
tor who saw TFP in their own sector of the economy—in the form, say, of
patents that had just been obtained or the latest marketing information on
a new product. Gilchrist said that he and Saito did not intend to promote
the view that the Fed knows more than the private sector.
Jordi Galí commented that it was important to ﬁnd variables that would
indicate the state of the economy in a manner that did not depend on the
details of the assumed model or the nature and dynamic properties of the
underlying shocks hitting the economy. It would be appropriate for policy-
makers to respond to variables of this sort, whereas no consistently wel-
fare-improving response would be possible if it required detailed knowl-
edge of the economy’s structure and the dynamic process of shocks to the
economy.
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